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ASSESSMENT OF THE COMMUNITY HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS' ABILITY AND 
WILLINGNESS TO RESPOND TO A BIOTERRORIST ATTACK IN FLORIDA 
 
Jeffrey S. Crane 
ABSTRACT 
Previous findings have demonstrated that the preparedness and infrastructure of the 
public health system are inadequately developed for a biological and/or chemical 
terrorism attack. (1-4)  Chen et al. reported that those primary care providers that would 
have to respond to such an attack do not feel prepared to diagnose and manage such an 
event.(5)  
This research was an observational study using e-mail/web based survey to assess 
the levels of preparedness (PL) and willingness to respond (WTR) to a bioterrorism 
attack, and identify factors that predict PL and WTR of Florida community healthcare 
providers.  The conceptual framework and questionnaire was designed based on 
empirical studies and the use of an expert panel to assess the providers’ administrative 
and clinical competencies, WTR, and PL. The questionnaire was pilot-tested in 30 
subjects.  Reliability was high (Cronbach’s alpha =.82).  The emailed invitaiton letters 
were sent to 22,800 healthcare providers in Florida. The questionniare was posted for 7 
days on the website during December, 2004. 
 There were 2,279 respondents of 9,124 who received the e-mails.  Response rate 
was 28%, with 86% completed questionnaires.  The subjects included physicians 
(n=604), nurses (n=1,152), and pharmacists (n=486). The results demonstrated that only 
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32% of the Florida providers were competent and willing to respond to a bioterrorism 
attack.  82.7% of providers were willing to respond in their local community and 53.6% 
within the State.  The subjects were more competent in administrative skills than clinical 
knowledge (62.8% vs. 45%).  The most competent areas were the initiation of the 
treatment and recognition of their clinical and administrative roles.  The least competent 
areas were identifying the cases and communicate risk to the others.  About 55% of the 
subjects had previous bioterrorism training and 31.5% had emergency drills.  Gender, 
race, previous training and drills, preceived threats of bioterrorism attack, and preceived 
benefits of training and drills and “feeling” prepared were the predictors of overall 
preparedness. 
 The findings suggest that only one-third of Florida community healthcare 
providers were prepared for a bioterrorism attack.  To effectively plan for a bioterrorism 
attack it is important to target the interventions to improve clinical knowledge in every 
healthcare profession.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
“ … you asked me what keeps me awake at night, and that bothers me… 
this biological issue…” 
President Bill Clinton, 1991 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past century, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) have been introduced 
by nation states at an increasing rate.  Thirteen nation states are currently suspected in 
either possessing weaponized biological agents and/or having an offensive production 
program (6). These include the seven U.S. designated terrorist nation states (state 
sponsored terrorism - Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria, and Sudan)(7). The 
ability to produce biological and chemical agents by localized terrorist groups has also 
been proven with incidences such as the 1994 Matsumoto sarin attack (7 dead, 600 
injured), the 1995 sarin attack in the Tokyo subway system (5 dead, 565 hospitalized)(8), 
and the 1998 Wakayama arsenic incident (4 dead, 67 injured)(9).   
Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, the average American citizen had not 
been directly affected by a terrorist attack. These attacks were the first highly lethal 
confrontation by a foreign force on the U.S. mainland since the War of 1812.  Before this, 
most of the acts of terrorism were targeted abroad to the U.S. military personnel and U.S. 
Foreign Service government employees (see Table 1-1 for complete listing of attacks). In 
total, 18 known fatal terrorist attacks against the United States (abroad) were perpetrated 
by foreign radical Islamists since 1983. The Oklahoma City bombing and the 1993 World 
Trade Center bombing being the exceptions, even then the responsible individuals were 
apprehended. These facts allowed average Americans to apply the “Out-of Sight”, “Out 
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of Mind” way of thinking and not view the attacks as a direct threat to them and to their 
way of life.   
However, the September 11th attacks that killed thousands of innocent people 
(Flight 93, Pentagon and World Trade Center) and was replayed on national television 
around the clock, did demonstrate to U.S. government officials, and to the average 
citizen, that foreign terrorists had the resolution and capability to plan, organize, and 
execute attacks that can produce mass casualties to Americans on the U.S. mainland (10). 
These terrorist attacks brought a dramatic change to the way Americans live their lives 
and view terrorism.  Americans were immediately on high alert and the preparedness 
activities to prevent another such “airliner” attack had begun. 
In the months following the September 11th  attacks, the dispersal of anthrax 
spores via the U.S. Postal Service further raised questions concerning the United States’ 
ability to prevent and respond to not only “traditional” terrorism attacks such as 
bombings and shootings, but also to biological and chemical events. While the history of 
global warfare has demonstrated the effective use of microbial agents by government 
entities as weapons of war, biological terrorism was previously deemed an unlikely event 
in the U.S. by most terrorism experts. And when used in the past, targets of biological 
warfare were normally deemed as a military objective. (11) 
The military use of biological agents has been banned since the 1974 Biological 
Weapons Convention Signing (12) and its military use was normally for genocide (e.g. 
Smallpox contaminated blankets given to Indians). Now, it is the unsuspecting civilian 
populations that are the most likely targets by terrorists because even a small number of 
deaths, as experienced with the 2001 anthrax attacks (total of 5 deaths), produced great 
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terror in the U.S. population, thus causing critical parts of the nation’s infrastructure to 
virtually shut down (U.S. Postal System and the U.S. Senate). This potential to cause 
terror with the threat of a biological agent is why the term “bioterrorism” was coined.  As 
demonstrated by the 2004 National Elections in Spain, an act of terror (train bombing) 
could be used to advance the ideologies of the terrorist groups by influencing a regime 
change when correctly applied (Madrid, Spain, 199 dead, 1450 wounded).  
The technological advances in production and the desire, have made weaponized 
biological agents as capable as a nuclear weapon to produce mass terror and causalities, 
but at a fraction of the cost. (13)  The previous terrorist successes, such as in the Madrid 
example and September 11th, and the advances in production, motivates terrorist groups 
to obtain known weaponized biological and chemical agents or search out other agents 
commonly available. So each year, more chemical and biological agents have to be added 
to the list of possible weapons that could be used against civilian populations.   
With the introduction of each new potential agent, Florida’s community 
healthcare providers are faced with making a correct diagnosis in their medical setting, 
reporting it to the correct authority, and the possibility of responding as an agent of the 
Florida Department of Health.  While medical practice has always been considered the 
science of probability and the art of uncertainty, it is recognized that uncertainty is 
prevalent in health care practices and that uncertainty is a crucial factor in decision-
making.  However, literature on how physicians, pharmacists and nurses make judgments 
under uncertain conditions is full of controversy. (14)   Clearly, formal and informal 
education and training has advanced healthcare providers’ ability to correctly improve 
patients’ health status and quality of life over the last 100 years during normal 
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circumstances, but with the added factors attributed to weaponized biological and 
chemical agents released in a civilian population, it is uncertain whether Florida 
providers are able and willing to make crucial decisions without having basic 
competencies in bioterrorism identification and management, and the willingness to care 
for infected patients.  
The introduction of awareness level bioterrorism trainings and seminars for 
healthcare providers since the 2001 anthrax attacks should have improved the 
bioterrorism competency levels of community providers and their willingness to respond. 
Without access to a prepared workforce of community healthcare providers during a 
bioterrorism attack within Florida, the biological incident life cycle would result in chaos 
of Florida’s population (see Figure 1-1). This will provide for an increase in morbidity 
and mortality rates in Florida’s population and the spread of the disease across the U.S., 
and the World. 
 
Figure 1-1. Biological Incident Life Cycle without Preparedness. Source: Adapted from 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) information. 
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Problem Statement 
Previous findings have demonstrated that the preparedness and infrastructure of the 
public health system are inadequately developed for a biological and/or chemical 
terrorism attack (1;2;4;15). Additionally, it was found that those primary care providers 
that would have to respond to such an attack do not “feel” prepared to diagnose and 
manage such an event. (5) 
Since these studies were originally published in 2002, the State of Florida with the 
support of federal government agencies became recognized as one of the national leaders 
of Public Health Preparedness. (16) Even so, the inherent shortfalls of the bioterrorism 
planning process within the State of Florida and its contractors led to the questionable 
ability to effectively activate the bioterrorism plans during an actual response to a large-
scale biological event without the support of the local community healthcare providers 
(physicians, nurses and pharmacists).  
 
 
Table 1-1. Select Terrorist Attacks on the United States Abroad 
Event Location Results 
1983 U.S. Embassy bombing Beirut, Lebanon 63 dead 
1983 U.S. Embassy bombing Kuwait 6 dead 
1984 U.S. Marine barracks bombing Beirut, Lebanon 241 dead 
1985 U.S. Embassy bombing Beirut, Lebanon 24 dead 
1985 U.S. Military base bombing Frankfurt, Germany 3 dead 
1996 Khobar Towers Saudi Arabia 19 dead, 515 wounded 
1998 U.S. Embassy bombings Nairobi, Kenya 301 dead, over 5000 injured 
1998 U.S. Embassy bombings Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania 301 dead, over 5000 injured 
2000 USS Cole Aden, Yemen 17 dead, 39 injured 
 
    
Using the recommended planning methodology advocated by the Florida 
Department of Health and its contractors, the average local county emergency 
management plans’ (CEMP) strategic national stockpile and mass casualty attachments, 
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normally located in the Emergency Support Function (ESF) 8, Health and Medical annex, 
as written would require on average over 97% of the licensed healthcare providers to 
come from the local community and/or outside the affected county to fully activate (17-
21). As an example, the Dade County Health Department serves a population of 2.25 
million and has 864 employees with approximately 23% core licensed medical 
professionals (physicians, nurses and pharmacists).  Using the State template, in a large-
scale biological event, Dade County Health Department's plan would require 15,589 
persons with 10,048 being core licensed medical personnel to administer smallpox 
vaccinations to its population.  This is a planning shortfall of 14,725 total personnel with 
9,849 in core medical personnel.  The whole population of the State of Florida would 
require 117,846 total persons and 75,968 core medical personnel (see Table 1-2 for a 
complete list of Florida staffing calculations).  Thus, theoretically, when the counties 
developed these response plans, it must have been assumed that the community health 
care providers have the basic competencies to identify and manage a biological terrorism 
attack, and are willing to respond to a bioterrorism event. 
This study was motivated by the recognized threat of weaponized biological agents, 
such as Smallpox, being released upon Florida’s population and the uncertainty that the 
planning efforts by the State of Florida since 2001 could become operative during a 
biological terrorism attack.  Specifically, this study took an empirically-driven approach 
in the assessment of Florida’s community healthcare providers’ current preparedness 
levels, the factors that influenced these levels, and the willingness of the provider to 
respond to a bioterrorist attack within the State of Florida.  The study’s findings may be 
used for policy assessment and planning purposes. 
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Table 1-2. Staffing Calculations for a Florida Bioterrorism Response using the 
Weill/Cornell Bioterrorism and Epidemic Response Model (BERM). (Based 
on Smallpox, 5 day response,16 hrs per day with15% downtime.) 
 
County Population Seasonal Total PoP Core Staff Support Staff Total Staff
Alachua 217,955 36,359 254,314 994 548 1,542
Baker 22,259 3,773 26,032 159 87 246
Bay 148,217 21,223 169,440 663 365 1,028
Bradford 26,088 3,573 29,661 159 87 246
Brevard 476,230 77,252 553,482 2,164 1,193 3,357
Broward 1,623,018 367,530 1,990,548 7,784 4,292 12,076
Calhoun 13,017 2,006 15,023 137 75 212
Charlotte 141,627 30,652 172,279 674 371 1,045
Citrus 118,085 24,570 142,655 558 308 866
Clay 140,814 34,828 175,642 687 379 1,066
Collier 251,377 99,278 350,655 1,372 756 2,128
Columbia 56,513 13,900 70,413 275 152 427
DeSoto 32,209 8,344 40,553 159 87 246
Dixie 13,827 3,242 17,069 159 87 246
Duval 778,879 105,908 884,787 3,460 1,908 5,368
Escambia 294,410 31,612 326,022 1,275 703 1,978
Flagler 49,832 21,131 70,963 277 153 430
Franklin 11,057 2,090 13,147 159 87 246
Gadsden 45,087 3,982 49,069 192 106 298
Gilchrist 14,437 4,770 19,207 159 87 246
Glades 10,576 2,985 13,561 159 87 246
Gulf 13,332 1,828 15,160 159 87 246
Hamilton 13,327 2,397 15,724 159 87 246
Hardee 26,938 7,439 34,377 159 87 246
Hendry 36,210 10,437 46,647 182 101 283
Hernando 130,802 29,687 160,489 628 346 974
Highlands 87,366 18,934 106,300 416 229 645
Hillsborough 998,948 164,894 1,163,842 4,551 2,510 7,061
Holmes 18,564 2,786 21,350 159 87 246
Indian River 112,947 22,739 135,686 531 293 824
Jackson 46,755 5,380 52,135 204 112 316
Jefferson 12,902 1,606 14,508 159 87 246
Lafayette 7,022 1,444 8,466 159 87 246
Lake 210,528 58,424 268,952 1,052 580 1,632
Lee 440,888 105,775 546,663 2,138 1,179 3,317
Leon 239,452 46,959 286,411 1,120 618 1,738
Levy 34,450 8,527 42,977 168 93 261
Liberty 7,021 1,452 8,473 159 87 246
Madison 18,733 2,164 20,897 159 87 246
Manatee 264,002 52,295 316,297 1,237 682 1,919
Marion 258,916 64,083 322,999 1,263 696 1,959
Martin 126,731 25,831 152,562 597 329 926
Miami-Dade 2,253,362 316,268 2,569,630 10,048 5,541 15,589
Monroe 79,589 1,565 81,154 317 175 492
Nassau 57,663 13,722 71,385 279 154 433
Okaloosa 170,498 26,722 197,220 771 425 1,196
Okeechobee 35,910 6,283 42,193 165 91 256
Orange 896,344 218,853 1,115,197 4,361 2,405 6,766
Osceola 172,493 64,765 237,258 928 512 1,440
Palm Beach 1,131,184 267,666 1,398,850 5,470 3,016 8,486
Pasco 344,765 63,634 408,399 1,597 881 2,478
Pinellas 921,482 69,823 991,305 3,876 2,138 6,014
Polk 483,924 78,542 562,466 2,199 1,213 3,412
Putnam 70,423 5,353 75,776 296 163 459
St. Johns 123,135 39,306 162,441 635 350 985
St. Lucie 192,695 42,524 235,219 920 507 1,427
Santa Rosa 117,743 36,135 153,878 602 332 934
Sarasota 325,957 48,181 374,138 1,463 807 2,270
Seminole 365,196 77,667 442,863 1,732 955 2,687
Sumter 53,345 21,768 75,113 294 162 456
Suwannee 34,844 8,064 42,908 168 93 261
Taylor 19,256 2,145 21,401 159 87 246
Union 13,442 3,190 16,632 159 87 246
Volusia 443,343 72,631 515,974 2,018 1,113 3,131
Wakulla 22,863 8,661 31,524 159 87 246
Walton 40,601 12,841 53,442 209 115 324
Washington 20,973 4,054 25,027 159 87 246
FLORIDA 15,982,378 3,044,452 19,026,830 75,968 41,878 117,846  
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Specific Aims 
This study was designed to serve three major purposes: 1) to give insight into 
Florida’s community healthcare providers’ clinical and administrative competencies to 
manage a bioterrorism attack, 2) to give insight into their willingness to respond to a 
biological terrorism attack within the State of Florida, and 3) to assess the current level of 
preparedness of Florida’s community health care providers (physicians, pharmacists and 
nurses) to identify and manage a biological terrorism attack. 
 
Research Questions 
1. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists 
and nurses) prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack? 
2. Are the levels of preparedness to respond to a bioterrorism attack different 
among physicians, pharmacists, and nurses?  
H1: Florida’s physicians, pharmacists and nurses are not equally 
prepared to identify and manage a biological terrorism attack. 
3. Do Florida’ healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists and nurses) 
“Feel” prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack? 
4. Do previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict the 
overall level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
H1: Previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict the 
overall level of preparedness of the healthcare providers. 
5. Do previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict the 
Florida’s healthcare providers’ willingness to respond to a biological 
terrorism attack within the State of Florida?  
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H1: Previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict the 
willingness of the community healthcare providers to respond to a 
biological terrorism attack within the State of Florida.  
6. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists 
and nurses) willing to respond to biological agent attacks within their local 
community?  
7. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists 
and nurses) willing to respond to biological agent attacks outside their 
local community (statewide)?  
8. Do demographic factors of Florida’s community healthcare providers 
(physicians, pharmacists and nurses) predict a biological terrorism overall 
level of preparedness?  
H1: Demographic factors of Florida’s community healthcare providers 
(physicians, pharmacists and nurses) predict a biological terrorism 
overall level of preparedness.  
9. Does the perceived benefit of bioterrorism preparedness training predict 
the overall level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
H1: The perceived benefit of bioterrorism preparedness training predicts 
the overall level of preparedness of the healthcare provider.  
10. Does the perceived threat that a provider's community is at real risk of a 
bioterrorism attack predict the overall level of preparedness of the 
healthcare providers?  
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H1: The perceived threat that a provider's community is at real risk of a 
bioterrorism attack predicts the overall level of preparedness of the 
healthcare provider.  
11. Do the demographics, perceived threat of bioterrorism attack, perceived 
benefits of bioterrorism training, previous trainings, and previous drills 
predict the level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
H1: The demographics, perceived threat of bioterrorism attack, perceived 
benefits of bioterrorism training, previous trainings, and previous drills 
predict the level of preparedness of the healthcare provider. 
 
Implications of this Study 
The findings of this study will allow for the future development of training, 
mobilization and management models for healthcare personnel to adequately respond to a 
public health crisis.  It will also set the baseline value to evaluate future public health 
preparedness activities in the State of Florida and could be used as a benchmark for 
public health preparedness levels for across the nation.  This study directly assesses the 
current levels of preparedness of Florida’s community health care providers’ core 
bioterrorism competency levels and their willingness to respond to biological terrorism 
attack.  This will help identify possible weaknesses in current “planned” public health 
responses to a biological terrorism attack within the State of Florida, and across the 
nation. 
 Based on the results of the survey, tools and models can also be developed to help 
increase the health care system’s readiness for a bioterrorism event and other public 
health crisis (e.g. SARS) in Florida.  Training models based on the study’s findings can 
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be used to enable educational facilities (universities and continuing education programs) 
the ability to efficiently and successfully integrate public health emergency readiness 
competencies within established training programs of healthcare personnel.   
The questionnaire that was developed for this study and tested for its validity and 
reliability can be used to assess the level of preparedness to respond to a bioterrorism 
attack in other states, in a certain type of healthcare providers, or a certain situation (e.g., 
anthrax event).  This questionnaire also can be used for a healthcare institution which 
would want to assess the preparedness of its providers and develop its own training. 
The methodology to identify administrative and clinical competencies, willingness 
to respond, and overall preparedness can be utilized as a model to target for training of 
healthcare providers, and for future research. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
 
Chapter 1, Introduction, examined the history of terrorism and problems that are 
faced by Florida’s healthcare providers. It stated the specific aims that the study will 
focus upon, and listed the research questions and implications for this study.  The 
remainder of this chapter will define the key terms used in this dissertation and by 
individuals in the fields of public health preparedness and emergency management. It 
will also list the assumptions made and the known limitations of this study.  
Chapter 2, Literature Review, will discuss the development of the conceptual 
framework for this study and the use of the Public Health Workers’ Emergency 
Preparedness Core Competencies for Emergency Response and Bioterrorism and the 
Clinician Competencies in Initial Assessment and Management (22). It also will examine 
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all the relevant literature and studies on provider preparedness levels, public health 
preparedness, bioterrorism preparedness and the administration of online surveys.  
Chapter 3, Research Methodology, will address the methods used in this study. 
This includes the determination of the sampling frame and survey sample size, the 
methods for collecting the data, including the letters of invitation and the design of the 
questionnaire.  This chapter also looks at the measurements used to determine the 
competency levels of the providers and their willingness to respond and discusses how 
the data will be analyzed.  
Chapter 4, Results, will describe the distribution of the questionnaire, and the 
descriptions of the study subjects and their work place.  It will also detail the assessment 
of the healthcare providers’ competency levels and willingness to respond which 
determined the overall preparedness level of Florida healthcare providers.  Finally, it will 
present the findings of the predictive modeling of an individual’s overall preparedness 
level. 
Chapter 5, Discussion, will discuss Florida’s community healthcare providers’ 
clinical and administrative competencies to manage a bioterrorism attack, the providers 
willingness to respond to a biological terrorism attack within the State of Florida, and  
their current level of overall preparedness to identify and manage a biological terrorism 
attack.  This chapter also provides discussions on the study results, methodology, and its 
limitations. 
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Definition of the Key Terms 
 
• Bioterrorism- The act of terrorism using biological agents (see Terrorism 
below). 
• Public Health Core Competency- It is an area of expertise that is a basic and 
necessary component to public health workers.  An example of a bioterrorism 
response core competency for public health worker is the ability to use a fax 
machine.  It is not nuclear response training for all workers in the public 
health system.  
• Smallpox- Smallpox is a highly contagious, virulent, and often fatal disease 
caused by variola virus, a large orthopoxvirus of the family Poxviridae, 
subfamily Chordopoxvirinae. (23) 
• Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) - “The SNS is a national repository of 
antibiotics, chemical antidotes, antitoxins, life-support medications, IV 
administration, airway maintenance supplies, and medical/surgical items. The 
SNS is designed to supplement and re-supply state and local public health 
agencies in the event of a national emergency anywhere and at anytime within 
the U.S. or its territories.” (24) 
• Terrorism- “Acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal 
laws of the United States or any state and appear to be intended to intimidate 
or coerce a civilian population, influence the government by intimidation or 
coercion, or to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, 
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assassination, or kidnapping, occurring primarily within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States.” (18 United States Code 802)  
• Terrorist Nation States – These are Nations that fund terrorism. 
• War of 1812- A war (1812-1814) between the United States and England 
which was trying to interfere with American trade with France, and it is the 
war that inspired the National Anthem (The Star Spangle Banner). 
  
List of Assumptions 
1. Staffing Calculations for a Florida Bioterrorism Response using the 
Weill/Cornell Bioterrorism and Epidemic Response Model (BERM) were 
based on the 2000 U.S. Census. It is assumed that Florida counties that were 
not examined also took the recommendation of the Florida Department of 
Health and its contractors, and used the BERM to calculate personnel needs. 
The BERM seems to be the standard method of calculation; it is used by 
Texas and other states (25). 
2. In a large scale event, the first responders and emergency room workers will 
become infected as undiagnosed patients are transported to hospitals, thus 
they should not have a major role in the plans.  These workers will be 
essentially the warning “Canaries” that alert the health care system of a major 
problem. 
3. Healthcare providers who are employed by hospitals should not be used or be 
relied upon to respond to a large scale crisis. These facilities are already short 
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in personnel and are needed to keep the hospital functioning.  In most cases, 
the hospital systems rely upon each other.  If one hospital fails, all other 
hospitals will have a problem keeping the doors open.   
4. Large numbers of healthcare providers will refuse to work because of the fear 
of becoming ill and/or placing their own family at harm by working. (26)  
5. The “worried well” will overwhelm the healthcare system. 
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“But the most troubling threat, in my judgment, is biological weapons. 
They may be quite small, and the raw material for some of the most 
fearsome ones - such as anthrax - is readily available, unlike fissionable 
material.” 
 
Testimony of R. James Woolsey 
U.S. House of Representatives  
Committee on National Security  
22 February 12, 1998 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
To better understand current US preparedness activities and the need to have a 
prepared volunteer workforce of community healthcare providers to respond to biological 
terrorism events, this chapter will first discuss the risks of bioterrorism in the United 
States, the State of Florida and its local communities, types of biological agents that 
could be used for bioterrorism attacks and the possible damage from such attacks.     
Second, a discussion on the current planning activities within the State of Florida and the 
methods that will keep the population protected and/or treated will be discussed.  Third, 
the researcher will provide literature review on current preparedness levels of healthcare 
providers within the United States and their willingness to respond.  Forth, core 
competencies that have been used for assessment of preparedness and willingness to 
respond to bioterrorism attacks will be discussed.  Fifth, the researcher will exam the 
psychosocial theory, Theory of Planned Behavior, that is used in the theoretical 
framework as factors related to preparedness and willingness of healthcare providers.  
Sixth, the conceptual framework for this study will be discussed.  Finally, the use of an 
mixed model (email/web) survey verses a traditional mail survey will be examined. 
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History of Bioterrorism 
 The use of disease as a weapon of war is as old as war itself.  Water supplies have 
been contaminated with animal and human corpses as early as the 1346 Tartar siege of 
the seaport of Kaffa.  It was stated that plague victims were catapulted over the walls of 
the besieged city. (27)  To devastate the opposing forces during the French and Indian 
War of 1763, British soldiers presented smallpox infested blankets and handkerchiefs to 
Native Americans (28), killing large portions of the indigenous population.  During 
World War II, the Japanese used flea-borne plague to attack cities in China.  Their 
infamous Unit 731 used soldiers and civilians alike to conduct its experiments with 
biological weapons. (29) 
By the 1950s, several countries including the Soviet Union and the United States 
had extensive biological weapons programs.  These programs were weaponizing bacteria, 
biotoxins and viruses to be dispersed in aerosols, bombs and missiles. (30)  The Soviet 
program had over 50,000 scientists and technicians dedicated to biological weapons 
productions (six research labs and five production plants). (31)  The total production 
capacity of all of the facilities involved was many hundreds of tons of various agents 
annually. 
On April 10, 1972, the Biological Weapons Convention, after much debate, was 
signed.  Under the terms of the Convention, no parties thereto would undertake the 
development, production, stockpiling, or acquire biological agents, toxins or the means of 
its delivery.  This agreement also stated that all such materials would be destroyed within 
nine months once the Convention entered into force.  The United States announced its 
compliance to the Convention on December 26, 1975. (32)  Then, in 1979, an accidental 
release of weaponized anthrax from a Soviet production plant killed 70 people in 
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Sverdlovsk and injured countless others. (33)  This event illustrated the deadly 
effectiveness of biological warfare in the modern age and the ineffectiveness of the 
Biological Weapons Convention.  
 In the 1980s, it was demonstrated that terrorist groups had the desire and 
capability of weaponizing and use of biological weapons.  These groups were smaller in 
size and independent of a Nation State.  The Rajneeshee Cult (1984) used Salmonella to 
contaminate salad bars in an attempt to influence a local election in Oregon.  It did 
succeed in infecting 751 residents of that community, but the fact that it was a biological 
attack went undiscovered for six months before one of the group’s members confessed.  
(34)This demonstrated the difficulties in the detection of a small bioweapon attack.  In 
1995, another attack involved the Aum Shinrikyo Doomsday Cult in Japan.  Its attack of 
the Japanese subway system using sarin gas not only demonstrated the successful aerial 
dispersal of nerve agent by a small terrorist group, but the inability of healthcare 
providers to effectively respond to such attack.  Many of the first responders and hospital 
personnel were affected by the gas due to the lack of or improper decontamination of the 
presenting patients.  After further investigation into the Shinrikyo Cult, it was revealed 
that it also attempted to release anthrax from the rooftop of a Tokyo building in 1993.  No 
casualties were reported because the cult did not understand air flow dynamics in a city. 
If the cult had a better understanding and released the spores at a different time during the 
day, it may have resulted in a quite different outcome. 
 During 1998 and early 1999, a large number of letters containing white power 
were received by businesses, targeted individuals and governmental offices in the United 
States. These letters were accompanied by phone calls threatening an anthrax attack. (28)   
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Even though these letters turned out to be hoaxes with benign powers ranging from 
cornstarch to baby power, it was a precursor to the 2001 attacks.  Events during the 
Clinton Administration, which included these 1998 white power letters, the fall of the 
U.S.S.R. and the unemployed weapons scientists, Iraq and high profile terrorist attacks in 
the United States and abroad, galvanized the U.S. Congress to refocus on the civilian 
biodefense program in 1999.  Congress allocated $121 million to be used by the CDC to 
improve its bioterrorism detection and response capabilities and to help establish a 
national pharmaceutical stockpile (later renamed to the Strategic National Stockpile). (3)  
 Shortly after the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks, letters laced with 
weaponized anthrax began arriving to members of the media and high ranking 
government officials via the U.S. Postal System.  The letters resulted in 22 identified 
cases of anthrax between October and November of 2001.  Of these cases, eleven were 
inhalational anthrax resulting in five deaths. (35)  The cases occurred on the eastern coast 
(Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, New Jersey and New York City) and 
produced massive anxiety throughout the United States.  It disrupted critical services to 
the United States, such as mail delivery and the U.S. Senate.  This attack confirmed that 
even a small bioterrorism attack (5 deaths) upon the citizens of the United States has the 
ability to cause mass terror in the population.  It also demonstrated the inability of the 
public health system to effectively identify and respond to biological agents.  
Bioterrorism is a recognized threat to the population of Florida and the United States.  
Massive funding for the planning and response to a biological weapon has taken place 
since theses attacks. The Florida Department of Health (FDOH) has received $111 
million alone for bioterrorism during fiscal years 2003 and 2004. (16) 
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Bioterrorism Agents 
Since there are numerous agents capable of being used as a potential biological 
weapon, the CDC developed a list that categorizes agents in the order of the seriousness  
of concern they present.  The agents are reviewed annually and are either placed in 
Category A, B, or C.  Agents in Category A are considered the most dangerous because 
they are easily disseminated, highly contagious and can be weaponized.  They have the 
ability to cause mass causalities and are hard to manage without a sophisticated public 
health system response. (36) These agents include anthrax (Bacillus anthraces), botulism 
(Clostridium botulinum), plague (Yersinia pestia), smallpox (Variola major), tularemia 
(Francisella tularensis), and viral hemorrhagic fevers (Filoviruses and Arenaviruses). 
(37)  
The Category B agents are moderately easy to disseminate, produce moderate 
morbidity and low mortality, and are normally delivered in contaminated water and food 
sources.  These agents include, but not limited to brucellosis (Brucella species), cholera 
(Vibrio cholerae), ricin toxin (Ricinus communis), salmonella, and viral encephalitis. (37)  
These agents also require enhancements to disease surveillance and diagnostics systems 
to detect.  
The Category C agents are emerging pathogens that have the potential to be 
weaponized for mass dissemination. (36)  The agents are included in this category 
because of their availability, ease of production and its potential to cause high morbidity 
and mortality.  These agents include emerging infectious diseases such as the Nipah virus 
and hantavirus. (37) 
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Smallpox  
Smallpox is contagious and sometimes fatal infectious disease, which has no 
specific treatment.  The only prevention for the smallpox disease is vaccination.  The 
name smallpox means “spotted” in Latin.  It refers to the raised bumps that appear on an 
infected person.  It was once a global disease, but was declared eradicated in 1980 by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) after a successful worldwide vaccination program 
(38).  In the United States, the last case of smallpox was in 1949, and the last naturally 
occurring case in the world was in 1977.  This was accomplished by the general 
vaccination program that ended in the 1970s in the United States and 1982 worldwide.  
Since the anthrax attacks in 2001 and the potential of smallpox being used as a 
bioweapon, the vaccination of the U.S. population began again.  In Florida, the Operation 
Vaccinate Florida I & II (OVF) has been in operation since 2002.  It focuses on the 
vaccination of the first responders such as paramedics, firefighters and police.  The 
promotion was only partially successful because of the highly publicized adverse effects 
and deaths attributed of the vaccine. 
Two forms of smallpox exist: Variola major, which is the most severe and common 
form of smallpox and carries a 30% case-fatal rate in an unvaccinated population, and 
Variola minor, which historically carries a case-fatality rate of 1% or less. (38) It is less 
common and a much less severe disease.  Smallpox is considered to be at the top of the 
list of Categories A diseases because of its high mortality and morbidity rates and its ease 
of transmission from human-to-human.  For this reason, only Smallpox will be examined 
(Category A) for this study.  If we are prepared against a smallpox attack, we should be 
able to respond to all other known bioweapons (“the all-hazards approach”).   
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The smallpox (Variola Major) is acquired through the respiratory track and spread 
throughout the body via the lymph nodes.  There is a 7 to 17 days latent-incubation phase 
(average 12-14 days) and then a prodromal phase that normally lasts for 2 to 3 days. (39) 
During the prodromal phase, the subject normally presents flu-like symptoms such as 
severe headache, backache and high fever (40c +).  Once this phase is complete, the 
lesions start to appear.  The transmission from person to person is the greatest during the 
first 7 to 10 days of these lesions. (38)  After 8 to 9 days, the lesions begin to scab over. 
Unlike chickenpox, which is commonly confused with smallpox by the general public, 
the pox lesions are normally at the same stage of development and are present mainly on 
the face, hands and extremities. (39) Death normally results from toxemia and super-
infections.  Patients that survive are severely scarred with pitted lesion and/or pox marks.  
 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Activities 
The very concept of public preparedness (also know as domestic preparedness) 
came into effect during the early years of the cold war when the Soviet Union 
successfully detonated its first atomic bomb.  This resulted in the development of the 
Civil Defense Program and the signing of the Civil Defense Act of 1950.  The Civil 
Defense Act of 1950 had the policy and intent of the U.S. Congress to provide a civil 
defense system for the protection of life and property of the United States from all 
attacks, including ones from natural disasters.   This Act effectively made the protection 
of the civilian population a joint federal-state charge with the primary responsibility for 
civil defense residing in the state and local government structures.  Most of the basic 
principles of civil defense were developed during this timeframe and are still relevant to 
our current U.S. preparedness programs.  
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Like the former civil defense programs, public health preparedness starts at the 
state and local levels.  This concept is based on the fact that the initial recognition and 
response to a biological attack will be at the local level with support from the State.  
Local emergency managers and public health officials have a unique perspective of their 
communities.  They understand the hazards and risks of a bioterrorism attack to the 
community and the resources it has available to respond.  Like all emergencies, once the 
local community needs exceed the local resources, they will contact the State, and if the 
State exceeds its resources, the Governor will make a formal request to the President.  
The President has the option to declare a federal emergency or just provide federal 
support.  This process could take hours or days dependant upon the urgency of the 
situation.  The local emergency manager will continue to manage the incident within 
his/her community, even when it becomes a federally declared emergency and support 
from the state and federal government has arrived the scene.  
In addition, during a large scale event such as a hurricane or smallpox release, 
numerous communities may be competing for the same state and federal resources (e.g. 
personnel and equipment).  Since state and federal resources may not be immediately 
available to the local community, the local community (e.g. government agencies, 
hospitals, and utilities) must have an emergency operations plan (EOP) and a county 
mass casualty plan that can be activated with resources located within it boarders.  In the 
case of a bioterrorism attack, the local community must have the ability to respond in a 
timely manner, since only a short window exists to provide vaccinations, prophylaxis 
and/or implement other counter measures. (40), (41) These communities should drill and 
exercise these plans to identify shortfalls and to familiarize the personnel. 
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Public health preparedness is crucial and should be performed at all levels of the 
public health care system.  To enhance the capabilities of the federal, state and local 
bioterrorism preparedness levels, the CDC as part of its strategic plan implemented the 
Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program.  This program has five focus areas.  
They are 1) preparedness and prevention; 2) detection and surveillance; 3) laboratory; 4) 
response; and 5) communication.  All five focus areas have training and research at it 
core. (42)  These areas have been incorporated into the core public health workers 
bioterrorism competencies and are within the Florida Department of Health preparedness 
structure. 
The State of Florida, according to a report released in December 2003, made great 
improvements within its public health system since 2001.  It was tied with California, 
Maryland and Tennessee as the most prepared states within the nation, achieving 7 out of 
10 preparedness indicators. (16) These indicators were based off the five focus areas set 
forth by the CDC (see above).  Of these 10 indicators, this research will focus on 
indicator 4, “Sufficient Workers to Distribute the National Stockpile Supplies.”  While 
Florida received credit for successful completion of this indicator (16) because it has a 
strategic national stockpile plan for most counties, it is questionable whether the state has 
“sufficient” workers to distribute the antibiotics and/or administer inoculations during 
large biological attack (smallpox).  The community healthcare providers (“workers”) 
preparedness levels and willingness to respond during the activation of the Strategic 
National Stockpile will be the focus of this research.  
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The Strategic National Stockpile 
Congress tasked the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) with the creation of the National 
Pharmaceutical Stockpile (NPS) in 1999. (43)  The Strategic National Stockpile (SNS), 
as it is formally known today, is a national repository, the mission of which is to provide 
a re-supply of large quantities of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies and equipment to be 
used in an event of national emergency within the United States and its territories.  This 
repository includes antibiotics, antidotes to various chemicals, antitoxins, airway 
maintained and medical/surgical supplies that can be used to treat thousands of 
individuals during a crisis event.  Its primary purpose is to provide critical medications 
and medical supplies that would not otherwise be available to the affected community. 
(44)  
The decision to request the SNS assets are based on numerous factors, such as an 
overt release of a biological agent that cannot be handled by the State health department 
or outbreak surveillance warning signs of a possible large-scale outbreak.  Either way, the 
governor’s office will need to formally request the SNS to be deployed.  The final 
decision for SNS deployment is made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). (43) 
The SNS deployment is designed to be deployed in two phases.  The first phase is 
called the “12- Hour Push Package”.  These secure Plus Packages are strategically 
located throughout the United States and can be deployed and be on location within 12 
hours. (43) These locations are coordinated by each State and can be deployed to a 
designated hospital, Logistic Staging Areas (LSA) or Point of Distribution (POD) 
location.  These Push Packages have a broad spectrum of items, but are limited in the 
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amount of each.  The Push Package can be limited to the type of response needed. In the 
2001 anthrax responses, only antibiotics were deployed. 
The second phase is designed for a larger scale event, where additional 
pharmaceutical and medical supplies are needed. This phase utilizes the Vendor Managed 
Inventory (VMI) system. The VMI utilizes current pharmaceutical supply changes and 
private transports such as UPS and Federal Express.  The VMI will ship supplies that are 
tailored to the event type, if known.  These VMI shipments will be transported to the 
State LSA and should arrive within 24 to 36 hours.  At the LSA, the supplies will be 
repacked from bulk pharmaceutical packaging to individualized doses, if necessary.  
Then they will be deployed to the PODs in the same manner as the Push Package. 
The Logistical Staging Areas (LSA) are normally placed around a State to 
effectively receive either the Push Packages or the VMI shipments.  The LSA normally 
needs to be located near an airport that can handle a large aircraft.  The facility should be 
large enough to accommodate the shipment of supplies.  The LSA are kept confidential 
and are not open to the public.  The public will be seen at the Point of Distribution (POD) 
Locations.  
 
Point of Distribution Centers 
The POD is used to triage and provide prophylaxis medications to individuals who 
were potently exposed and, if necessary, provide large scale immunization of vaccines to 
the general population.  The location and number of PODs during an event are dependant 
on the size of the population affected.  Personnel requirements for the PODs within the 
State of Florida are calculated using the Weill-Cornell Bioterrorism and Epidemic 
Outbreak Response Model (BERM). 
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Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak Response Model (BERM) 
Florida’s decision to use the Weill-Cornell Bioterrorism and Epidemic Outbreak 
Response Model (BERM) as the centerpiece to determine the staffing needs to respond to 
a major disease outbreak and/or biological terrorist event on a specific population within 
the State may not have been the best choice.  It is not suggested that the model is 
incorrect, but that the model has been recommended by the Florida Department of Health 
for use in developing county strategic stockpile plans and mass casualty plans without 
determining the levels of preparedness and willingness to respond by community medical 
professionals not employed by the State.  The Florida Department of Health, as the 
Essential Support Function #8 (ESF) State Representative for the Office of Emergency 
Management (OEM), has been tasked as the lead agency in developing these plans by the 
Governor. 
The BERM model has been used by the local health departments, county 
emergency operation centers (EOC), and state contractors throughout Florida to develop 
the core bioterrorism response plans even though the staffing levels could not be fulfilled 
internally within the Florida Department of Health.  This was discussed briefly in Chapter 
1.  Another example of this problem is the Pasco County Health Department that serves a 
population of 388,908 permanent residents and has 212 employees with approximately 
24% licensed medical professionals (physicians, nurses and dentist).  According to the 
BERM estimates, in a large-scale biological event Pasco County Health Department would 
need 2,360 persons with 1,521 being core licensed medical personnel for five consecutive 
days.  This plan has a recognized shortfall of 2,148 total personnel with 1,469 in the core 
licensed medical personnel.  The CDC is currently under consideration of reducing the 
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required response time from 5 days to 2 days.  If this becomes a requirement of the SNS, 
the current estimate of personnel needed, will more than double. 
The BERM estimates and the working floor plans of the Points of Distribution 
center plans (POD) to dispense medications, even when adjusted, are requiring personnel 
levels over a one thousand percent (1000%) beyond what the county health departments 
have available during normal operations.  Local hospitals will not be able to lend 
personnel to the health department because of local surge in demand for its services and 
the possibility of a dirty hospital scenario.  Other government personnel such as teachers 
and transportation workers, even though not specified within current plans, could be used 
for non-core medical personnel positions.  The only real solution is to use community 
healthcare providers to fill these planned positions.  
 
Community Healthcare Providers’ Preparedness 
 The question that has been most frequently asked since the terrorist attack of 11 
September 2001 is: “Are we ready or not?”  Numerous studies have taken place since 
2001 on the United States’ ability to prevent and respond to future terrorist attacks.  
These studies have mostly focused on conventional terrorist methods, such as various 
styles of bombings.  The studies that did focus on biological agents or a bioterrorist attack 
have researched technology to identify an attack (sampling methods and surveillance) 
and the methods to decontaminate after an attack (processes and chemicals).  There have 
only been a few studies that have directly focused on the preparedness levels of 
healthcare providers, and of these, most targeted only physicians.   
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Roles of the Responding Healthcare Providers 
There are several roles of a healthcare provider, depending of the providers 
licensing.  As the plans and policies are currently written, during a bioterrorism attack 
only Florida licensed medical personnel can perform direct medical services. 
Credentialing of medical providers within Florida for such events is still under much 
debate.  One must hope that medical providers licensed in other states and/or retirees, will 
be allowed to treat patients during a Florida mass causality event.  As of 01/2005, this 
option was not approved. 
There are numerous roles for a community physician related to a bioterrorism 
event.  The first and foremost duty of a community physician is the early identification of 
individuals who have been exposed to a bioterrorism attack.  The physician is ultimately 
responsible for the identification and treatment of a biological weapon exposure.  Even 
so, in a nationwide survey, only 25 percent of family physicians felt prepared to respond 
to a bioterrorist event in 2001 (5) and again in 2002, only 21 percent of the physicians 
surveyed by the University of Chicago, felt personally well prepared for a bioterrorism 
attack. (45) All the studies to date rely on the self evaluation of the physician to 
determine bioterrorism preparedness levels.  Physicians responding to a bioterrorist 
attack will also provide the medical care to the patients as well as perform duties 
normally expected from the nurses such as patient triage and administrating smallpox 
inoculations. 
In the United States, there are approximately 900,000 practicing emergency nurses 
(46), so it has been assumed that the largest percent of licensed community healthcare 
providers to respond will be the nurses (RN, BSN). Nurses will also play a major role in 
recognition of potential bioterrorism attacks.  Nurses will serve as the triage staff at the 
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local Point-of-Distribution (POD) centers and hospitals.  They will be also responsible 
for vaccinating the worried well and the exposed during a terrorism attack.  As in the 
Middle Ages, nurses will be the primary caretakers of the infected.  While there have 
been several studies on the use of nurses volunteers in a bioterrorism event and education 
standards in nursing programs, there was not a study that directly addresses the perceived 
preparedness levels of nurses at the time of this study. 
Shortly after the 2001 attacks, National Pharmacist Response Teams (NPRTs) were 
formed.  These teams are formed of pharmacists, pharmacy students and pharmacy 
technicians.  They are authorized by Health and Human Services (HHS) to respond 
during a national emergency, such as a bioterrorism attack.  There are currently ten teams 
nationwide. (47) Most bioterrorism plans, response teams and surveillance systems in the 
State of Florida, while occasionally monitoring over-the-counter medications for spikes, 
do not include the pharmacist.  
Within this study, the pharmacist is also included.  It was felt that a pharmacist 
could be beneficial to Florida’s bioterrorism preparedness activities (other than the 
obvious dispensing of medications).  Additionally, pharmacist could potentially be the 
first to encounter an exposed patient in the community setting (drugstore).  Persons who 
have been exposed are more likely to self treat (common cold symptoms and rashes) in 
the early stages of the disease.  This will give the trained pharmacist the ability to identify 
individuals whom may have been exposed.  Pharmacists’ roles in a bioterrorism response 
range from clinical recognition, disease management, patient education (48), and from 
administration of the vaccines (PharmD. only) to the dispensing of the medications 
(R.Ph./PharmD.).  
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There are other medical personnel that have clearly defined roles or could be 
tapped into during a response.  The emergency medical technicians (EMT) and 
paramedics are the first responders and will probably be the first to begin to notice the 
increase in patient loads due to a bioterrorist attack.  They will also be the first of the 
healthcare providers to contract the disease themselves.  These responders will 
unfortunately be similar to a canary in the coal mines.  Their exposure is likely to signal a 
large bioterrorist event.  While these types of providers are crucial to a bioterrorism 
response, they were not included in this study.  
 
Previous Studies 
As stated earlier, previous study findings have demonstrated that the preparedness 
and infrastructure of the public health system are inadequately developed for a biological 
and/or chemical terrorism attack. (1),(2),(4);,(15).  It was also found that those primary 
care providers that would have to respond to such an attack do not “feel” prepared to 
diagnose and manage such an event. (5) This came as no surprise to public health 
officials when these studies were first released in 2001.  Bioterrorism attacks were not 
considered as a real threat in most areas prior to 2001.  Even as recent as June 2004, local 
public health Directors in Florida has verbally dismissed the notion of a bioterrorism 
attack within their particular counties and have considered a large scale bioterrorism 
preparedness a misuse of the health department resources. (49)  
Since these studies were originally published, the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Act of 2002 was passed.  This provided the CDC with $915 million dollars 
to boost States and major metropolitan areas response capabilities.  Then in early 2003, 
an additional $870 million was provided to the States by the CDC.  Other funding came 
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from various federal agencies, such as Health and Human Services’ HRSA funding.  
HRSA funding provided another $622.5 million since 2002.  This totals more than 2.4 
billion dollars during fiscal years 2002 and 2003. (16) Of the 2.4 billion, Florida was 
awarded approximately $111 million dollars from the CDC and HHS for bioterrorism 
response.  This is not all inclusive for Florida’s bioterrorism funding sources.  
While all of the States received funding, many are still unprepared.  A recent study 
that examined 10 key indicators found that while most States have made some progress, 
most have fundamental structure problems that could threaten the United States’ ability to 
respond to a large-scale public health emergency. (16)  Majority of the states (70%) 
received scores of 50% or below (5 or less indicators), which is indicative of a successful 
national comprehensive bioterrorism response within the current public health system.  
These indicators include having a statewide bioterrorism plan, provisions that no more 
than 3 counties are left without alert capabilities, passing of at least 50% of federal funds 
to the local health departments, and sufficient staffing to distribute the Strategic National 
Stockpile (SNS). (16)  Florida is one of the four states that scored 70% (7 of 10 
indicators).  It was even suggested that the State had sufficient workers to distribute the 
SNS.  As explained earlier, the BERM estimates of licensed medical personnel needed 
for an SNS response would indicate that Florida does not have the trained and willing 
workforce to successfully respond to an actual large-scale bioterrorism incident.   
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Bioterrorism Core Competencies 
The incorporation of emergency preparedness activities and their assessment is an 
expected part for the national public health system, individual public health practitioners 
and local public health departments.  While the use of the Standards of Practice 
(assessment) has been in place since 1923 for public health services, the use of 
performance standards in the form of competencies have only gained acceptance in 
medical and public health professions in recent years.(22)  In 1998, the CDC’s Public 
Health Practice Program Office (PHPPO), in conjunction with the public health practice 
community, developed performance standards for state and local agencies that are 
representative of the essential services for public health.  With these completed and 
integrated within the public health agencies, the next step was to focus on particular areas 
within public health practice.  This is when the emergency preparedness standards (2000) 
were developed, which in turn evolved into the Emergency Response: Core 
Competencies for All Public Health Workers, first released in April 2001.  Following the 
2001 Anthrax Attacks, these competencies were reexamined and released as the 
Bioterrorism and Emergency Readiness: Competencies for all Public Health Workers in 
2003. (22) 
 
Selection of the Core Competencies for this Study 
The Public Health Workers’ Emergency Preparedness Core Competencies for 
Emergency Response and Bioterrorism, which were developed by the Columbia 
University School of Nursing, Center for Health Policy, and the Emergency Response 
Clinician Competencies in Initial Assessment and Management, developed by the 
Association of Teachers of Preventive Medicine in collaboration with Center for Health 
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Policy, Columbia University School of Nursing and 17 national associations, including 
the American Medical Association (AMA), were used in the development of the 
conceptual framework for this study. These projects were supported by the Center for 
Disease Control (CDC) and/or Prevention/Association of Teachers of Preventive 
Medicine Cooperative Agreement to insure the readiness of healthcare workers’ ability to 
perform in emergency and bioterrorism situations. (22) 
The researcher chose these competency sets as the base template for the 
determination of the bioterrorism competency level (BCL) because of its current 
integration into Florida’s public health care system and because it is the recognized set by 
the Center of Disease Control (CDC). (22)  Additionally, after reviewing numerous 
strategic national stockpile and mass causality plans for Florida’s county health 
departments the researcher believes that during an actual bioterrorism response, 
community health care providers would need to be integrated within Florida’s public 
health care system.  If this is done, community health care providers would be required to 
work within the constraints of the Florida public health system and would need to have 
the same levels of competency as the Department of Health employees when responding 
to the event. 
Upon the recommendation of the lead developer of the original competency sets, 
the individual competencies were used as the guiding template only and were not directly 
transplanted without adjustments to measure preparedness levels within this given 
population, and the duplications between the two competency sets were removed. (50) 
These modifications were developed through direct communications with emergency 
preparedness designated employees within the Florida Department of Health and 
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preparedness experts throughout the United States (see Table 2-1).  Once this was 
completed, a method of measuring the competency levels within community healthcare 
providers also had to be developed for this study.  This is discussed in Chapter 3 under 
Research Instrument: Phases of Development.   
 
Table 2-1 The Core Competency List as modified by experts for this study.         
ADMINISTRATIVE  COMPENTCIES (AC) 
Administrative Competency 1. Describe the role of your workplace in an emergency 
response. 
Administrative Competency 2. Identify the chain of command in emergency response. 
Administrative Competency 3. Identify and locate the agency’s emergency management 
plan. 
Administrative Competency 4. Describe his/her functional role(s) in emergency response and 
participate in these role(s) during regular drills. 
Administrative Competency 5. Demonstrate the correct use of communication equipment 
used for emergency communication. (phone, fax, radio, satellite phone) 
Administrative Competency 6. Ability to locate the communication role(s) in emergency 
response plan and understand his/her role. 
Administrative Competency 7. Identify limits to own knowledge, skill, and authority, and 
identify key system resources for referring matters that exceed these limits. 
Administrative Competency 8. Demonstrate creative problem solving and flexible thinking 
to unusual challenges within his/her functional responsibilities to respond to a bioterrorism 
event. 
CLINICIAN COMPETENCIES (CC)  
Clinical Competency 1. Describe his/her expected clinical role in bioterrorism response for 
the specific practice setting as a part of the institution or community response. 
Clinical Competency 2. Respond to an emergency within the emergency management system 
of his/her practice, institution and community. 
Clinical Competency 3. Recognize an illness or injury as potentially resulting from exposure 
to a biological, chemical or radiological agent possibly associated with a terrorist event. 
Clinical Competency 4. Ability to report identified cases or events to the public health 
authorities to facilitate surveillance and investigation using the established institutional or local 
communication protocol. 
Clinical Competency 5. Initiate patient care within his/her professional scope of practice and 
arrange for prompt referral appropriate to the identified condition(s). 
Clinical Competency 6. Communicate risks and actions taken to patients and concerned 
others clearly and accurately. 
Clinical Competency 7. Recognize and manage the psychological impact of a Bioterrorism 
event on victims and health care professionals, as appropriate to the event. 
Clinical Competency 8. Recognize unusual events that might indicate an emergency and 
describe appropriate action 
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Rationale and Conceptual Framework 
The purpose of this study is to identify healthcare providers’ level of 
preparedness, and to determine factors that predict the community healthcare providers’ 
clinical and administrative competency to manage a bioterrorism attack and to predict 
their willingness to response to a biological terrorism attack within the State of Florida. 
Various recognized sets of core competency sets (see appendix B.) for emergency 
preparedness were combined to form the Conceptual Framework for this study. 
 
Figure 2-1. Conceptual Framework of the Study. 
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Conceptual Framework of the Study 
The conceptual framework model (see Figure 2-1) for this study suggests that three 
domains should be used to determine the preparedness levels of the community 
healthcare providers.  The first domain is the willingness to respond to a bioterrorism 
attack, domain two describes administrative competencies, and domain three describes 
clinical competencies.  
The first domain examined whether the provider was willing to respond to a high 
risk event and to a low risk event, and at what distance (proximity) from the normal work 
place (local event, regional event, state event, national event).  This domain used a 
modified interpretation of the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) to help model an 
individual’s willingness to respond levels.  According to TRA the most important 
determinant of his/her behavior is a person’s behavioral intention, in this case, 
willingness to respond. (51;52) The direct determinants of an individual’s behavioral 
intention (willingness) are his attitudes toward performing the behavior (responding) and 
his subjective norm (perceived belief of professionals) associated with that behavior. (53)  
TRA has the underlying assumption that all individuals are rational actors (i.e. all 
individuals’ process information and are motivated to act on it).  The strength of the TRA 
is that it provides this study a framework for discerning the reasons that motivate 
individuals to perform a behavior. (52)  In the case of this study, we looked at the 
behavioral intentions in the issues of perceived threats/benefits for responding 
(community/family ties- proximity), the perceived community’s/personal ability to 
successfully respond and the perceived level of risk to the responders with various 
demographic factors.  This allowed the researcher to understand the factors associated 
with healthcare providers’ willingness to respond and to hypothesize the specific reasons 
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that can motivate the behavior of interest.  While TRA has not been directly used to 
explain the willingness to respond in an emergency (i.e., hurricane, bioterrorism), it has 
been used in predicting and explaining a wide range of health behaviors.  These 
behaviors include clinical breast exams, contraceptive use, drinking, mammography use, 
smoking, seat belt use, and safety helmet use. (54)  
 
 
Figure 2-2: Predictive Model of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Source: Based on Ajen. 
(55) 
 
The second domain examined the administrative competency of the healthcare 
provider.  It was developed using Public Health Workers’ Emergency Preparedness Core 
Competencies for Emergency Response and Bioterrorism.  These were used to determine: 
the providers’ ability to know the role of their workplace in an emergency response; the 
providers’ knowledge of their chain of command in emergency response; their ability to 
identify and locate the agency emergency response plan; knowledge of his/her functional 
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role(s) in emergency response and participation in these role(s) during regular drills; the 
providers competency level in the correct use of communication equipment used for 
emergency communication; the providers’ ability to locate the communication role(s) in 
emergency response plan and understand his/her role; the providers’ ability to identify 
limits to own knowledge, skill, and authority, and identify key system resources for 
referring matters that exceed these limits; and the ability to creatively solve problems and 
use flexible thinking for unusual challenges within his/her functional responsibilities to 
respond to a bioterrorism event.  
The third domain examined the clinical competency levels of the healthcare 
providers.  This domain was shaped using the Emergency Response Clinician 
Competencies in Initial Assessment and Management.  These competencies examined: 
the providers’ ability to know his/her expected clinical role in the bioterrorism response 
for the specific practice setting as a part of the institution or community response; ability 
to respond to an emergency event within the emergency management system of his/her 
practice, institution and community; ability to recognize an illness or injury as potentially 
resulting from exposure to a biologic, chemical or radiological agent possibly associated 
with a terrorist event; ability to report identified cases or events to the public health 
system; ability to facilitate surveillance and investigation using the established 
institutional or local communication protocol, and initiate patient care within his/her 
professional scope of practice and arrange for prompt referral appropriate to the identified 
condition(s); ability to communicate risks and actions taken clearly and accurately to 
patients and concerned others; ability to recognize and treat the psychological impact of a 
bioterrorism event on victims and health care professionals as appropriate to the event; 
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and the ability to recognize unusual events that might indicate an emergency and describe 
appropriate actions.  
In addition to the three domains, the researcher examined the provider’s individual 
demographics such as age, gender, race, highest educational degree, years worked as 
licensed professional, current position, employment status, and work duties.  It also 
examined the workplace demographics such as workplace zip code, patient encounter 
volume, city type, population size, workplace type, and the existence of a disaster plan at 
the workplace..  Perceived benefits and threats were used to examine the providers’ 
beliefs regarding the benefits of preparedness training, whether his/her community were 
at real risk of a bioterrorism attack, and whether they had the ability to respond to such an 
event.   
Finally, the different types of training methods and their ability to affect the overall 
preparedness levels of health care providers were examined.  The training types used in 
this study are grouped as: (1) traditional lecture format (i.e., slides, handouts, videos, 
etc.); (2) online interactive (i.e., discussion boards, tutorials, simulations, etc); (3) web-
casts, teleconferences, or satellite broadcasts and; (4) self learn, self paced study (i.e., 
independent study courses). 
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Data Collection Tools: a comparison among Web-based, e-mail, and traditional mail 
survey 
Traditional mail surveys have been used as a major data collection method in health 
professionals for their current knowledge, practice patterns, and attitudes of providing 
healthcare services.  Recently, email and Internet surveys became valid alternative data 
collection tools to traditional mail survey since researchers were allowed access to the 
Internet in early 1980s. (56-58)    
The early phases of email based surveys, the questionnaires were constructed using 
simple text (ASCII) and embedded in the body of an email and sent via Internet. (59;60)  
These email questionnaires had similar characteristics as paper surveys in respect of the 
format of the questions and its length limitation, except the email surveys obviously took 
shorter time to deliver to the recipients as compared to the traditional mail surveys.  
When the Internet became more widely accessed, web based surveys was introduced for 
data collection in early to mid 1990s in supplement to the email survey and even 
sometimes administrated solely in the that method.  In general, web based surveys had 
the ability to offer multimedia applications including audio, pictures, and video, which 
significantly improve the user interface with these interactive features.   
The benefits and limitations of email based and web based surveys, comparing to 
traditional mail surveys, are still under debate.  While several studies on email and 
traditional mail surveys suggest that email surveys have potential benefits over the 
traditional mail surveys by decreasing time of delivery and response, and cost (59;60), 
other studies found that email and web surveys have significantly lower response rates. 
(61-67)  Since this study applied a dual mode survey method using an email to introduce 
the research study and to provide a link to a web based survey, literature regarding an 
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email and a web based survey of health professionals are discussed in comparison to the 
traditional mail survey. 
This section discusses the issues regarding survey techniques, sample coverage, 
response rate, cost, time to response, and possible errors of web, email and traditional 
mail survey methods.  Comparisons of advantages and disadvantages of these survey 
methods are described based on literature.    
 
Survey Techniques 
 There are several advantages of a web based survey over mail survey, if the 
optimal web-survey software is applied.  First, the questions can be programmed to 
automatically input the data into the desired format.  Transcription errors during data 
entry are eliminated.  Second, logical check for the answers is possible by programming 
the order of the questionnaire items.  Third, web surveys allow real-time monitoring of 
the respondents and automatically send a follow-up message to the lists of non-
respondents in a timely manner.  Fourth, web surveys overcome one of the major 
limitations of traditional mail survey by automatically skipping the questions that are not 
applied to a certain population.  This technique is called “skip pattern automation”.  By 
using this technique, the length of the questionnaires and time to complete could be 
greatly reduced.  A study by Jepson et al. 2005 found that a negative association between 
the length of the questionnaires and response rates, and the completeness of the returned 
surveys. (68) 
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Survey Population Coverage and External Validity 
 For the traditional mail survey, the study population is well defined, then samples 
are selected by either convenient sample or a random sampling methods.  Then a letter of 
invitation and an informed consent form are sent by postage mail with or without the 
questionnaires.  Email surveys apply similar methods of selecting a study sample. (69;70) 
Several email survey studies have selected samples from members who have email 
address registered with professional associations, e.g., the American Urological 
Association (57), the College of Family Physicians of Canada (71), the Association of 
Cardiothoracic Anesthetists. (56)  The limitations of the email surveys regarding the 
representation of the population is that characteristics of people who have email 
addresses may be different from people who did not have an email address and thus, are 
not included in the study.  Email addresses might not be updated.  The samples may not 
receive the questionnaire survey due to the spam e-mail blocking software.  From the 
above limitations, email survey faces challenges that may compromise external validity.   
For the email combined with a web based survey, the same limitation of population 
coverage and external validity applied.  However, for web based survey alone it offers 
benefits in allowing unlimited access by any participant who volunteer to complete the 
survey.  Several studies recruited participants from advertising in newsgroups, specific 
web pages, or in newspapers, which obtained convenient samples.  From this method, 
there is no defined population and thus response rate cannot be calculated with this 
particular recruitment method for web-surveys.   
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Response rates 
Response rates of e-mail surveys vary based on the content of the survey and the 
populations.  A review by Chonlau et al. summarizes response rates of the Internet 
surveys in 31 studies. (72)  Web surveys obtained 7 to 44% response rates compared with 
6 to 68% for email surveys.  The author summarizes that the response rates of email and 
web surveys are usually lower than traditional mail survey.  However, using a web survey 
to supplement email survey shows an improvement response rates.  Examples of two 
studies of attitudes of physicians toward healthcare services using email and/or web 
survey found relatively high response rates.  Kedall and his colleagues conducted e-mail 
survey on infection control for adult cardiac surgery.  The response rate was 81% (29/36 
units). (56)  A study of attitudes of urogynecology and maternal-fetal medicine specialists 
toward primary elective cesarean delivery was conducted using email attached with web 
based survey.  Response rate after an initial email and two follow-up emails after one 
month was 52.9%. (70) 
A study of online resource utilization (Internet and email) of Scottish general 
practitioners found that small number of GPs using internet or email to communicate 
with their colleagues and patients (21%, 13%, and 4% respectively).  Younger GPs were 
more likely to use the Internet.  The results of this study suggest that web based or email 
survey modes may be more suitable for surveying younger practitioners.(58)   
 
Time of Delivery and Response 
 Seguin conducted a clinical trial in 2004 comparing response rate and time 
between email and traditional mail survey methods among Canadian family 
physicians.(71)  The study found that the response rate of a traditional survey is 
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significantly higher than an email survey (52.7% vs. 33.6%).  However, delivery and 
response time of the email survey was much faster than the mail survey.  Completeness 
of the content was not different between the two methods, but the email survey contained 
longer and more frequent comments.  The authors concluded that email survey is 
appropriate method when quick response is required.(71)   
 
Cost  
 Costs of web or email surveys compared with mail surveys are not still 
understudied.  According to the existing literature, costs varied depending on the types of 
survey, numbers of mail-outs or number of completed responses, and the implemented 
technology.  For the web survey, most costs were associated with personnel who design 
and test the survey.  Marginal personnel costs are almost always significantly greater than 
other marginal survey cost, e.g., paper, printing, and postage.    
 A study by Couper and his colleagues showed no significant cost benefit of e-mail 
survey compared with traditional mail survey. (61)  The cost in constructing e-mail 
surveys included the building and evaluating e-mail software which required more than 
150 hours and approximately cost $1.74 per completed case, while the cost of postage-
mail was $1.81 per reply.  In addition, in most cases email surveys require technical 
support, e.g., toll-free calls that add more cost of this method, which seemed to offset any 
potential savings. 
 The study from Schleyer and Forrest comparing cost of web and mail survey 
methods found that web survey cost 38% less than mail survey for 22-item 
questionnaires.(61)  However, the benefit depends on the number of respondents.  If there 
are more than 347 respondents; web survey offers cost-saving.  On the other hand, if the 
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number of respondents is less than 189, mail survey is preferable.  It is not a conclusive 
choice of method, if the respondents are between 189 and 347.    
 Other two studies concluded that email and web surveys are less expensive than 
mail surveys, when cost of personnel was excluded.  The results of the study in the UK 
indicated that email alone, and email and web cost less than mail surveys (35 pence, 41 
pence, and 92 pence per reply, respectively). (62) The authors referred to the cost saving 
simply from eliminating cost of paper, printing, and postage.   
 
Data Quality 
 Data quality is defined by the percentage of the respondents who have missing 
data at least one survey item or the percentage of the missing items per questionnaires. 
Literature suggests that traditional mail survey had significantly smaller percentage of 
missing items comparing with e-mail survey (0.3-0.8% vs. 0.3-3.7%). (61), ;(64), (73-75) 
Data quality based on the percentage of respondents who missed at least one 
questionnaire item is controversial.  Paolo et al. found that mail survey had lower rate of 
incomplete returned questionnaires compared with e-mail survey, 27% vs. 9%. (75), 
while Kiesler and Sproull found the opposite results (10% vs. 22%). (76)  Two other 
studies by Tse et al. found no significant different in the percent of incomplete responded 
questionnaires. (67), (77) 
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‘We’ll never use the damn germs…  
If someone uses germs on us, we’ll nuke ’em. ’ 
President Richard Nixon, 1969 
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CHAPTER 3 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This study was motivated by the recognized threat of weaponized biological agents 
being released upon Florida’s population and the uncertainty that Florida’s community 
healthcare providers have the necessary competency levels and the willingness to respond 
to a bioterrorism attack within the State of Florida.  Understanding the current 
competency levels of Florida’s community healthcare providers and their willingness to 
respond is crucial to the ability of the State of Florida to activate current bioterrorism 
plans.  The current plans rely on large numbers of licensed healthcare providers to 
diagnosis and treat patients.  The numbers currently required by these plans greatly 
exceed the number employed by the state government system, thus requiring licensed 
healthcare providers from the community to fill these roles.  
 
Study Design and Methodology 
The design of this study relied on the development of a conceptual framework that 
was based on the public health bioterrorism core competencies (see Chapter 2: 
Bioterrorism Core Competencies), and the design and implementation of a descriptive, 
cross-sectional survey to evaluate the level of bioterrorism preparedness of the healthcare 
providers in Florida.  The study also examine numerous factors that are related to 
preparedness levels, such as individual and workplace demographics, perceived benefits 
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and threats, and methods and modalities of trainings.  These factors, along with the 
“willingness to respond”, were examined from the point of view of their relationship to 
the preparedness levels of healthcare providers as a whole and between the professional 
groups.  The primary aims of this study was: 1) to give insight into Florida’s community 
healthcare providers’ clinical and administrative competencies to manage a bioterrorism 
attack, 2) give an insight into their willingness to response to a biological terrorism attack 
within the State of Florida, and 3) assess the current level of preparedness of Florida’s 
community health care providers (physicians, pharmacists and nurses) to identify and 
manage a biological terrorism attack.  The study also attempted to verify in Florida’s 
population of healthcare providers the 2002 study findings suggesting that 75% of the 
U.S. physicians do not "Feel" prepared to identify and manage a biological terrorism 
attack. (5) 
 
Survey Sample  
The population under study is all Florida licensed nurses, pharmacists and doctors. 
The only inclusion criteria are to have an active license in the State of Florida (population 
boundary), and reside in the State of Florida a portion of the year (geographic boundary).   
These particular professions were chosen because of their legal ability to either give 
and/or dispense medications/immunizations to humans in the State of Florida.  In a 
suspected biological terrorism attack, a large percentage of the health services provided 
are triaging and treatment by physicians and nurses, and the dispensing of antibiotic 
medications (pharmacists) and/or giving inoculations of the “Worried Well” population 
by all three professions.   
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A list of emails for Florida’s licensed nurses, pharmacists and physicians were 
retrieved from the State Board of each health profession and/or its professional association.  
These emails were selected for their convenience and the limited availability of funding 
resources to mail paper surveys.  A total of 42,000 emails were able to be retrieved for this 
study.  These emails were checked for duplication and visual accuracy (i.e. 
Name@Companyname.Com).  Duplicated emails were deleted and emails that had obvious 
errors (i.e. Name@Companyname.can), were corrected.  All uncorrectable emails were 
removed from the list.  
A non-probability sampling technique was used for this study.  By the fact that the 
emails were requested from different professional groups, quota sampling was used to 
obtain the required population proportions for each of the healthcare professions.  A total 
of 34,482 (16,807 Physicians, 2,807 Pharmacists, and 14,868 Nurses) emails that 
presented no visual errors were obtained.  A large proportion of these email addresses 
were 18 months or older.  
 
Sample Calculations 
Sample sizes were calculated based on 5% error rate, 95% confidence interval.  
There were 274,653 primary care physicians, 20,760 full-time pharmacists and 170,000 
nurses licensed in Florida in 2004.  The sample size requirement was 384 respondents for 
the physician grouping, 377 respondents for the pharmacist grouping, and 383 
respondents for the nurse grouping.  A 5% response rate was approximated, thus the 
researcher had to email a minimum of 7,600 questionnaire invitations to each healthcare 
profession.  A minimum of 22,800 total questionnaire invitations were sent to reach the 
required sample size.  Even though response rates for similar studies have been as high as 
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x 100 
65% (5), it was decided to use a 5% response rate.  This was due to the fact that the 
population of Florida previously had four major hurricanes and there could have been 
Internet connection outages and/or persons relocating to other states while their homes 
were being repaired.   The survey was managed completely via the world-wide web, and 
large percentage of provider emails collected for this study were 18 months or older.   
The average attrition rate of opt-in email addresses were 6 to 8% per month.(78)  
Estimating that the email mean age is 8 months, the total email attrition rates could range 
between 48% (16,551) to 64% (22,068).  The attrition rates were calculated using custom 
design server based logging software.  Even though the email could produce numerous 
return emails explaining the email was bad or blocked, the software could determine 
unique returns, filtering duplicates.  
The response rate (RR) was calculated as the surveys were completed, divided by 
the number of emails sent, minus the bounced /blocked emails due to attrition.  
 
Response Rate   =                   Surveys Completed                     
                                 Total Emails Sent – Bounced Emails 
 
 
Letters of Invitation 
Letters of invitation to participate in this study were sent out via email to healthcare 
providers.  The healthcare provider opted into the study by visiting the designated 
website listed in the email and agreed to complete the questionnaire.  The letter and the 
referring website outlines the subject’s right to confidentiality and the anonymity of the 
data.  
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This letter was sent out maximum three times to all participants.  Since no 
identifying information was collected during the survey, there was not a way of tracking 
which participant completed the survey, thus having to perform follow-ups with all 
participants.  Once the needed sample size was accomplished, no further email reminders 
were sent out.  
 
Research Instrument 
The questionnaire was offered completely online at the website, Questionpro.com 
and consisted of 59 questions presented in an attractive, brief and easy to respond format 
(see questionnaire in Appendix A.).  While this survey recruited participants via email, 
this survey is considered a World Wide Web (WWW) survey since the data was collected 
via a website and not by return emails.  
The survey was structured to reflect the objectives of the study, while at the same 
time not asking leading questions.  The survey utilized electronic branching, which varied 
the length of the survey depending on the answer applied to the previous question, and 
asked mostly closed questions to improve the response rates of the participants. 
  
Phases of Development 
The survey instrument was developed in several phases.  First, personal 
communications with known experts and the examination relevant literature were 
conducted to determine a method to measure Florida’s community health care providers’ 
“bioterrorism preparedness” level.  Second, the conceptual framework was developed 
(see Figure 2-1.) based on the information retrieved.   
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Third, a group of experts was asked to examine the study framework and the 
competencies used to measure the providers’ bioterrorism competency levels (BCL) for 
correctness.  The group assigned weights to each of the administrative and clinical 
competencies, and weighted the competency groups according to importance, using their 
expert knowledge and experience with the core competencies and emergency 
preparedness (see Figure 3-1).  This expert group included such members as the public 
health core bioterrorism and emergency competencies’ developer from Columbia 
University, Dr. Kristine Gebbie; the current Chief of Staff of the Office of Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness at Health and Human Services (HHS); the former Director of 
Navy Medicine, Office of Homeland Security; the Duty Director of the Global Center for 
Disaster Management and Humanitarian Action at the University of South Florida, along 
with preparedness experts employed by the State of Florida, particularly the Florida 
Department of Health.  These experts were chosen either because of their years of 
leadership experience in emergency planning and response, and/or their in-depth 
knowledge of bioterrorism and the core competencies.   
Fourth, other surveys and, when available, their results were examined from across 
the country.  It was decided to include a few of the same questions that were presented 
across the spectrum of surveys for future population comparability.  Since a survey 
instrument did not exist, the questionnaire had to be developed specifically for this study. 
The survey’s questions were developed to capture the necessary data. 
Fifth, content and face validity of the research instrument was conducted.  Face 
validity was conducted by a cursory review by fellow researchers, students and 
coworkers at the University of South Florida and the University of Florida.  Content 
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validity was assessed by experts in the Florida Department of Health, the University of 
Florida and other government agencies.  In addition, questions 46 through 49 were 
verified that those questions were able to correctly test a basic level of bioterrorism 
preparedness knowledge of the subjects.  To examine these particular questions, 30 
participants were separated in two subgroups of 15, novice and advanced.  The advanced 
subgroup was known to have the basic knowledge on bioterrorism and preparedness, 
while the novice subgroup was known not to have any knowledge of the subject.  Each 
subgroup included healthcare providers from each profession.  The advanced group 
answered all the questions correctly, while the novice subgroup only answered 25% 
correct.  The results confirmed that the questions had the ability to correctly determine 
whether the subject had basic knowledge of bioterrorism or not.  
Sixth, a pilot study was conducted to test the research instrument for internal 
validity and errors.  The internal validity or reliability (correlation between the questions) 
of the questionnaire for the questions regarding the preparedness level to bioterrorism 
attack was tested using Guttman Split-half approach, Cronbach’s alpha = .8109.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is greater than 0.65, which indicates that the questionnaire 
has high reliability. (79)  Demographic questions were not tested for reliability. Finally, 
the email invitation will be emailed out and data collected.  
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Figure 3-1.  Weighted Competency Values 
 
Data Collection 
The letter of invitation was sent via email to all subject participants.  The survey 
was opened on a Sunday night and ran for 7 days.  Reminder emails were sent out on 
days 3 and 7.  
The subjects who chose to opt into the survey followed a unique link to the website 
hosting the questionnaire and collecting the data.  This unique link assigned by the survey 
software prohibits the same person from taking the survey more than once.  
Once the participant arrived at the website, he/she received additional information 
about the survey and was given the option to “continue” the questionnaire.  The 
questionnaire only asked one question at a time and did not allow the return to the 
previous question, or to save and return at a later date.  Once the questionnaire was 
completed, the participant was directed back to the University of South Florida, College 
of Public Health website.  
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The website was password protected and encrypted for data security.  The data was 
kept in a database on the server until the survey was closed.  Once closed, the data was 
retrieved in both a comma-delimited format and in a Microsoft Excel® formatted file. 
Once the data was successfully retrieved, the survey and the data were permanently 
removed from the server. 
 
Data Preparation 
The data, once collected from the server, was visually inspected for quality control. 
SPSS, version 11.5 (80) was selected as the preferred statistical software program to 
conduct the analysis. 
Measurements 
 Demographic characteristics of the Florida healthcare providers were collected 
using 15 questions.  There are two types of characteristics: individual and workplace 
characteristics that are potentially associated with the bioterrorism preparedness level.  
Individual’s characteristics include: age, gender, race, highest educational degree, years 
worked as licensed professional, current position, employment status, and work duties.  
Workplace characteristics are zip code, patient encounter volume, city type, population 
size, and workplace type.  These demographic variables were tested for the prediction of 
the preparedness level using a logistic regression model. 
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Figure 3-2. “Willingness to Respond”- Example Proximity of the Events 
 
Willingness to Response 
 Willingness to respond within Florida was assessed in six situations based on the 
proximity of the events (local, regional, and statewide, see Figure 3-2) and the level of 
personal risks to the healthcare providers (low risk and high risk).  The question used a 5-
point Likert Scale to measure the level of willingness to respond (1-5, very likely to very 
unlikely).  The score was calculated in each situation as one (willing to respond), if the 
subjects choose “very likely” or “somewhat likely”, and zero (not willing to respond), if 
the subjects choose “neither likely or unlikely” or “Somewhat unlikely” or “Very 
unlikely”.   
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Willingness to Respond in their Local Community (within the county) 
 The healthcare provider willingness level in the providers’ local community 
(HCPWLlocal) was calculated based on two survey questions (questions 50 and 54) 
addressing the willingness to respond to a high risk event and a low risk event in their 
local community.   
 
HCPWLlocal = (WRhr_local + WRlr_local)  
    2 
 
HCPWLlocal: Mean score of the healthcare provider willingness level in the 
providers’ local community 
WRhr_local:  Willingness to respond score with high risk to provider’s safety in a 
local community response 
WRlr_local:  Willingness to respond score with low risk to provider’s safety in a 
local community response 
 
Willingness to Respond within the Region (surrounding counties) 
The healthcare provider willingness to respond level within the region 
(HCPWLregion) was calculated based on two survey questions (questions 51 and 55) 
addressing the willingness to respond to a high risk event and a low risk event within the 
surrounding counties.  
 
HCPWLregion = (WRhr_rg + WRlr_rg)  
   2 
 
HCPWLregion: Mean score of the healthcare provider willingness level within the 
counties surrounding the local community  
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WRhr_rg:  Willingness to respond score with high risk to provider’s safety to 
bioterrorism events within the counties surrounding the local 
community 
WRlr_rg:  Willingness to respond score with low risk to provider’s safety to 
bioterrorism events region within the counties surrounding the local 
community 
 
 
Willingness to Respond within the State of Florida 
The healthcare provider willingness to respond level within the State of Florida 
(HCPWLstatewide) was calculated based on two survey questions (question 52 and 56) 
addressing the willingness to respond to a high risk event and a low risk event within the 
State of Florida.  
 
HCPWLStatewide = (WRhr_statewide + WRlr_statewide)  
   2 
 
HCPWLstatewide: Mean score of the healthcare provider willingness level within the 
State of Florida  
WRhr_statewide:  Willingness to respond score with high risk to provider’s safety to 
bioterrorism events within the State of Florida 
WRlr_statewide:  Willingness to respond score with low risk to provider’s safety to 
bioterrorism events region within the State of Florida 
 
 
Willingness to Respond within the United States 
The subjects were asked about their willingness to respond at the U.S. level (at high 
risk and low risk situations).  This assessment provided additional information of whether 
Florida healthcare providers were willing to respond to the events outside Florida. The 
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healthcare provider willingness to respond level within the United States (HCPWLusa) 
was calculated based on two survey questions (questions 53 and 57) addressing the 
willingness to respond to a high risk event and a low risk event within the United States.  
 
HCPWLusa = (WRhr_usa + WRlr_usa)  
   2 
 
HCPWLusa: Mean score of the healthcare provider willingness level within the 
United States  
WRhr_usa:  Willingness to respond score with high risk to provider’s safety to 
bioterrorism events within the United States 
WRlr_usa:  Willingness to respond score with low risk to provider’s safety to 
bioterrorism events region within the United States 
 
Administrative Competency Level (ACL) 
 The administrative competency level was measured in two terms: 1) the mean 
percentage of the sample population who are competent (number of subjects who are 
competent in each competency divided by total number of subjects), e.g., on average 80% 
of subjects are competent in the administrative core competencies, and 2) the mean 
percentage of the individuals’ competency level (number of competencies possessed by a 
subject divided by eight), e.g., on average the subjects are competent in 70% of the 
overall core administrative competencies.  
ACL was calculated by the weighted average of each of the eight administrative 
core competencies (see Figure 3-1).  Eight experts assigned the weight to each 
competency based on a total weight of 100% divided between the eight competencies.  If 
the competencies are equally important the weight is 12.5%.  The mean weight of each 
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competency was calculated from all assigned weights from the experts.  This mean 
weight was used in the calculation of the ACL of the sample.   
    
ACL = (0.103*AC1) + (0.126*AC2) + (0.103*AC3) + (0.159*AC4) + 
(0.153*AC5) + (0.062*AC6) + (0.103*AC7) + (0.191*AC8) 
Note: The descriptions of AC1-8 are described below. 
 
Administrative Competency 1 (AC1) 
AC1: Describe the role of your workplace  in an emergency response.  
The AC1 was demonstrated in one question (question 37).  If the subject knew their 
workplace’s role in a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Strongly Agree” or “Agree”), the 
value of one was assigned to this variable.  If the subject did not know their workplace’s 
role in a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Neither Agree nor Disagree”, “Disagree” or 
“Strongly Disagree”), the value of zero was assigned.  
 
Administrative Competency 2 (AC2) 
AC2: Identify the chain of command in emergency response. 
The AC2 was demonstrated in one question (question 36).  If the subject knew their 
chain of command in a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Strongly Agree” or “Agree”), the 
value of one was assigned to this variable.  If the subject did not know the chain of 
command in a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Neither Agree nor Disagree”, “Disagree” 
or “Strongly Disagree”), the value of zero was assigned.  
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Administrative Competency 3 (AC3) 
AC3: Identify and locate the agency’s emergency management plan. 
The AC3 variable was demonstrated using two questions.  If the subject knew if the 
organization had an emergency response or disaster plan (question 13, answer of “Yes”), 
a value of one was assigned to variable AC3Ident and if the subject knew where the plan 
was located (question 14, answer of “Yes”), the value of 1was assigned to variable 
AC3Locate. The variable called AC3 was assigned a score of one, if both AC3Ident and 
AC3Locate had a score of one.  If either AC3Ident or AC3Locate had a value of zero, a zero 
was assigned to AC3.  If the subject did not know if the organization had an emergency 
response or disaster plan (question 13, answer of “NO” or “I do not know”), the value of 
zero was assigned to AC3.  
 
Administrative Competency 4 (AC4) 
AC4: Describe his/her functional role(s) in emergency response and participate in 
these role(s) during regular drills. 
The AC4 variable was demonstrated using two questions.  If the subject knew 
his/her functional role in an emergency response (question 35, answer of “Strongly 
Agree” or “Agree”), a value of one was assigned to variable AC4Role and if the subject 
had participated in a disaster drill (question 21, answer of “Yes”), the value of one was 
assigned to variable AC3Part.  The variable called AC3 was assigned a score of one, if 
both AC3Role and AC3Part had a score of one.  If either AC3Role or AC3Part have a value of 
zero, a zero was assigned to AC3.  If the subject did not know his/her functional role in 
an emergency response (question 35, answer of “Neither Agree or Disagree”, “Disagree, 
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or “Strongly Disagree”) or if the subject had not participated in a disaster drill (question 
21, answer of “No”), the value of zero was assigned to AC3.  
 
Administrative Competency 5 (AC5) 
AC5: Demonstrate the correct use of communication equipment used for emergency 
communication. (phone, fax, radio, satellite phone) 
The AC5 was demonstrated in one question (question 20).  If the subject knew how 
to use three of four communication methods (each of the following marked “True”: 
Phone, Fax, Radio or Satellite Phone), the value of one was assigned to this variable.  If 
the subject did not know how to use three of four communication methods (each of the 
following not marked: Phone, Fax, Radio or Satellite Phone), the value of zero was 
assigned to AC5.  
 
Administrative Competency 6 (AC6) 
AC6: Ability to locate the communication role(s) in the emergency response plan 
and understand his/her role. 
The AC6 variable was demonstrated using two questions.  If the subject knew 
whom to call to report/refer a suspected bioterrorism attack (question 38, answer of 
“Strongly Agree” or “Agree”), a value of one was assigned to variable AC6Refer and if the 
subject knew if the emergency plan addressed communications (question 19, answer of 
“Yes”), the value of one was assigned to variable AC6Plan.  The variable called AC6 was 
assigned a score of one, if both AC6Refer and AC6Plan had a score of one.  If either 
AC6Refer or AC6Plan had a value of zero, a zero was assigned to AC6.  If the subject did 
not know whom to call to report/refer a suspected bioterrorism attack (question 38, 
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answer of “Neither Agree or Disagree”, “Disagree, or “Strongly Disagree”) or if the 
subject did not know if the emergency plan addressed communications (question 19, 
answer of “No”), the value of zero was assigned to AC6.  
 
Administrative Competency 7 (AC7) 
AC7: Identify limits to own knowledge, skill, and authority, and identify key system 
resources for referring matters that exceed these limits. 
The AC7 was demonstrated in one question (question 40).  If the subject knew their 
limits in knowledge, skill and authority in a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Strongly 
Agree” or “Agree”), the value of one was assigned to this variable.  If the subject did not 
know their limits in knowledge, skill and authority in a suspected bioterrorism attack 
(“Neither Agree nor Disagree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”), the value of zero 
was assigned TO AC7.  
 
Administrative Competency 8 (AC8) 
AC8: Demonstrate creative problem solving and flexible thinking to unusual 
challenges within his/her functional responsibilities to respond to a 
bioterrorism event. 
The AC8 variable was demonstrated using two questions.  If the subject had current 
knowledge of the medical aspects of the management of bioterrorism related illnesses 
(question 45, “Very Good” or “Good”), a value of one was assigned to variable AC7Solve 
and if the subject had been trained for chemical or biological terrorism (question 25, 
answer of “Yes”), the value of one was assigned to variable AC8Trained.  The variable 
called AC8 was assigned a score of one, if both AC8Solve and AC8Trained have a score of 
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one.  If either AC8Solve or AC8Train have a value of zero, a zero was assigned to AC8.  If 
the subject did not have current knowledge of the medical aspects of the management of 
bioterrorism related illnesses (question 45, answer of “Fair” or “Poor”), or if the subject 
had not been trained for chemical or biological terrorism (question 25, answer of “No”), 
the value of zero was assigned to AC8.  
 
Clinical Competencies Level (CCL) 
The clinical competency level was measured in two terms: 1) the mean percentage 
of the sample population who were competent (number of subjects who are competent in 
each competency divided by total number of subjects), e.g., on average 80% of subjects 
were competent in the clinical core competencies, and 2) the mean percentage of the 
individuals’ competency level (number of competencies possessed by a subject divided 
by eight), e.g., on average the subjects are competent in 70% of the overall clinical core 
competencies.  
CCL was calculated by the weighted average of each of the eight clinical core 
competencies (see Figure 3-1).  Eight experts assigned the weight to each competency 
based on a total weight of 100% divided between the eight competencies.  If the 
competencies were equally important the weight is 12.5%.  The mean weight of each 
competency would be calculated from the all assigned weights from the experts.  This 
mean weight was used in the calculation of the CCL of the sample.   
    
CCL = (0.113*CC1) + (0.118*CC2) + (0.153*CC3) + (0.11*CC4) + 
(0.129*CC5) + (0.131*CC6) + (0.106*CC7) + (0.14*CC8) 
Note: The descriptions of CC1-8 are described below. 
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Clinical Competency 1 (CC1) 
CC1: Describe his/her expected clinical role in bioterrorism response for the 
specific practice setting as a part of the institution or community response. 
The CC1 variable was demonstrated using two questions.  If the subject knew their 
role as a health care provider in a suspected bioterrorism attack in their community 
(question 35, “Strongly Agree” or “Agree”), a value of one was assigned to variable 
CC1Role and if the subject knew their role according to the organization’s emergency 
response / disaster plan (question 16, answer of “Yes”), the value of one was assigned to 
variable CC1Role2.  The variable called CC1 was be assigned a score of one, if both 
CC1Role and CC1Role2 had a score of one.  If either CC1Role or CC1Role2 had a value of 
zero, a zero was assigned to CC1.  If the subject did not know their role as a health care 
provider in a suspected bioterrorism attack in their community (question 35, answer of 
“Neither Agree or Disagree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”), or if the subject did 
not know their role according to the organization’s emergency response / disaster plan 
(question 16, answer of “No”), the value of zero was assigned to CC1.  
 
Clinical Competency 2 (CC2) 
CC2: Respond to an emergency within the emergency management system of 
his/her practice, institution and community. 
The CC2 was demonstrated in one question (question 50).  If the subject was 
willing to respond to a high risk event bioterrorism event that affected their community 
(“Very Likely” or “Somewhat Likely”), the value of one was assigned to this variable.  If 
the subject was not willing to respond to a high risk event bioterrorism event that affected 
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their community (“Neither Likely nor Unlikely”, “Somewhat Unlikely” or “Very 
Unlikely”), the value of zero was assigned.  
 
Clinical Competency 3 (CC3) 
CC3: Recognize an illness or injury as potentially resulting from exposure to a 
biological, chemical or radiological agent possibly associated with a terrorist 
event. 
The CC3 was demonstrated in questions 46, 47, 48, and 49.  These questions tested 
the current knowledge of the subject to recognize an illness or injury as potentially 
resulting from exposure to a biological agent used in a terrorism attack.  If the subject 
could answer at least 50 percent of the questions correctly, the value of one was assigned.  
If the subject could not answer 50 percent of the questions correctly, the value of zero 
was assigned. 
 
Clinical Competency 4 (CC4) 
CC4: Ability to report identified cases or events to the public health authorities to 
facilitate surveillance and investigation using the established institutional or 
local communication protocol 
The CC4 was demonstrated in one question (question 38).  If the subject knew 
whom to call to report / refer a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Strongly Agree” or 
“Agree”), the value of one was assigned to this variable.  If the subject did not know 
whom to call to report / refer a suspected bioterrorism attack (“Neither Agree nor 
Disagree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”), the value of zero was assigned.  
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Clinical Competency 5 (CC5) 
CC5: Initiate patient care within his/her professional scope of practice and arrange 
for prompt referral appropriate to the identified condition(s). 
The CC5 variable was demonstrated using two questions.  If the subject had current 
knowledge of the medical aspects of the diagnosis of bioterrorism related illnesses 
(question 44, “Very Good” or “Good”), a value of one was assigned to variable CC5Diagn 
and if the subject had current knowledge of the medical aspects of the management of 
bioterrorism related illnesses (question 45, “Very Good” or “Good”), the value of one 
was assigned to variable CC5Manage.  The variable called CC5 was assigned a score of 
one, if both CC5Diagn and CC5Manage had a score of one.  If either CC5Diagn or CC5Manage 
had a value of zero, a zero was assigned to CC5.  If the subject did not have current 
knowledge of the medical aspects of the diagnosis of bioterrorism related illnesses 
(question 44, answer of “Fair” or “Poor”), or if the subject did not have current 
knowledge of the medical aspects of the management of bioterrorism related illnesses 
(question 45, answer of “Fair” or “Poor”), the value of zero was assigned to CC5.  
 
Clinical Competency 6 (CC6) 
CC6: Communicate risks and actions taken to patients and concerned others 
clearly and accurately. 
The CC6 was demonstrated in one question (question 45).  If the subject had 
current knowledge of the medical aspects of the management of bioterrorism related 
illnesses, which included communicating risks to the patient (“Very Good” or “Good”), 
the value of one was assigned to this variable.  If the subject did not have current 
knowledge of the medical aspects of the management of bioterrorism related illnesses, 
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which included communicating risks to the patient (“Fair” or “Poor”), the value of zero 
was assigned.  
 
Clinical Competency 7 (CC7) 
CC7: Recognize and manage the psychological impact of a Bioterrorism event on 
victims and health care professionals, as appropriate to the event. 
The CC7 was demonstrated in one question (question 40).  If the subject could 
recognize and treat the psychological effects to victims and health care professionals due 
to bioterrorism attack (“Strongly Agree” or “Agree”), the value of one was assigned to 
this variable.  If the subject could not recognize and treat the psychological effects to 
victims and health care professionals due to bioterrorism attack (“Neither Agree nor 
Disagree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”), the value of zero was assigned.  
 
Clinical Competency 8 (CC8) 
CC8: Recognize unusual events that might indicate an emergency and describe 
appropriate action. 
The CC8 was demonstrated in one question (question 39).  If the subject could 
recognize signs and symptoms of an illness due to bioterrorism in their own patients 
(“Strongly Agree” or “Agree”), the value of one was assigned to this variable.  If the 
subject could not recognize signs and symptoms of an illness due to bioterrorism in their 
own patients (“Neither Agree nor Disagree”, “Disagree” or “Strongly Disagree”), the 
value of zero was assigned.  
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Bioterrorism Competency Level (BCL) 
Bioterrorism competency level was the overall weighted mean scores of the ACL 
and the CCL.  Eight experts assigned the weight to the BCL based on a total weight of 
100% divided between ACL and CCL.  There were two types of measurements of the 
BCL corresponding to the measurements of the ACL and the CCL, of which : 1) the 
mean percentage of the sample population who were competent (number of subjects who 
were competent in each competency divided by total number of subjects), e.g., on 
average 80% of subjects were competent in all core competencies, and 2) the mean 
percentage of the individuals’ competency level (number of competencies possessed by a 
subject divided by eight), e.g., on average the subjects were competent in 70% of all core 
competencies.  
 
BCL = (0.364*ACL) + (0.636*CCL) 
 BCL: Bioterrorism competency level 
 ACL: Administrative competency level 
 CCL: Clinical competency level 
 
Preparedness Level (PL) 
 Preparedness level is comprised of two components: healthcare provider 
willingness to response at the statewide level (HCPWLstatewide) and the bioterrorism 
competency level (BCL).  The researcher created the PL variable based on matching each 
subject in HCPWLstatewide and BCL.  To have the PL value coded as “prepared” (value of 
1), the subject had a HCPWLstatewide “willing to respond” value greater than 50% of the 
time, and had a BCL “competency level” that is greater than 50%.  If the subjects did not 
follow the above inclusion criteria, the PL value was coded as “not prepared” (value of 
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0). Matching was used because the subject may have had a high bioterrorism competency 
level (BCL = 100%) but not willing to respond to an event in Florida (HCPWLstatewide = 
0%), or vice-versa (BCL = 0% and HCPWLstatewide = 100%).  To be prepared, the subject 
must have been willing to respond to a bioterrorism event and must have had a minimal 
level of competency to effectively function without endangering him/herself and others. 
  
If  HCPWLstatewide  > 50% AND  BCL > 50%,  PL = 1 
Or,   If  HCPWLstatewide  < = 50% OR  BCL < = 50%,  PL = 0 
  
The PLoverall was calculated by the number of subjects who are prepared (PL=1) 
divided by total number of sample subjects.  
 
 PLoverall = Number of subjects with PL=1   
                 Total number of sample subjects 
 
Perceived Benefits of Bioterrorism Training (PBT) 
 This variable was measured by a question (question 43) asking whether they 
perceived it was important to have bioterrorism preparedness training.  The scale was 3-
point scale: not important at all (a score of 0), important (1), and very important (2).  The 
PBT variable was tested in the logistic regression model as to whether it predicted the PL 
or did not predict the PL. 
  
Perceived Threats of the Risk of a Bioterrorism Attack in the Local Community 
(PTR) 
 This variable was measured by a question (question 33) asking whether they 
perceived threats of the risk of a bioterrorism attack within the provider’s local 
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community.  The scale is 5-point Likert scale: strongly disagree to strongly agree (1-5, 
respectively).  The PTR variable was tested in the logistic regression model as to whether 
it predicted the PL or did not predict the PL. 
 
Healthcare Providers’ “Feeling” Prepared (FP) 
 The healthcare providers’ “feeling” prepared was measured by one question 
(question 58) asking whether they felt prepared to diagnose and manage the bioterrorism 
attack.  The scale is 3-point scale: not prepared (a score of 0), somewhat prepared (1), 
and very prepared (2).   
  
Previous Participation in Preparedness Drills (PPD) 
 Previous participation in preparedness drills was assessed by one question 
(question 21).  If the subjects participated in any preparedness drills, the value of one was 
assigned to this variable.  If the subjects did not participate in the disaster drills within the 
last 12 months, the value of zero was assigned.  The PPD variable was tested in the 
logistic regression model as to whether it predicted the PL or did not predict the PL. 
 
 Previous participation in Preparedness Trainings (PPT) 
The previous participation in preparedness trainings was asked assessed one 
question (question 23).  If the subject participated in any preparedness trainings, the value 
of one was assigned to this variable.  If the subject did not participate in the preparedness 
trainings, the value of zero was assigned.  The PPT variable was tested in the logistic 
regression model as to whether it predicted the PL or did not predict the PL. 
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DATA ANALYSES 
 
1.  Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists and 
nurses) prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack? 
 
The percentage of overall preparedness level (PLoverall) of all subjects in the study 
is presented in Chapter 4. 
 
2. Are the levels of preparedness to respond to a bioterrorism attack different among 
physicians, pharmacists, and nurses?  
 
The percentages of overall preparedness level (PLoverall) of each professional 
grouping (physicians, pharmacists, and nurses) was compared using Chi-Square 
test (χ2 ) at a significance level of .05. (α = .05). 
 
3. Do Florida’ healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists and nurses) “Feel” 
prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack? 
 
The percentages of the Florida’s healthcare providers who did not “Feel” prepared 
(“not prepared” vs. “somewhat prepared” and “very prepared”) is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
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4. Do previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict the overall level 
of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
 
Logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the previous training or 
drills predicted the preparedness level (PL) at significance level of .05 (α = .05). 
PL = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ℮                       (Model 1) 
 
β0: intercept of the model 
x1 : Previous participation in preparedness drills (PPD) 
x2 : Previous participation in preparedness training (PPT) 
Note: x1 and 2 are categorical variables  
 
 
5. Do previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict the Florida’s 
healthcare providers’ willingness to respond to a biological terrorism attack 
within the State of Florida?  
 
Logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the previous training or 
drills predicted the healthcare provider’s willingness to respond within the State 
of Florida (HCPWLstatewide) at significance level of .05 (α = .05). 
 
HCPWLstatewide = β0 + β1x1+ β2x2 + ℮         (Model 2)     
 
β0: intercept of the model 
β1-2 : coefficient of each factor 
℮ : error term 
x1 : Previous participation in preparedness drills (PPD) 
x2 : Previous participation in preparedness training (PPT) 
Note: x1-2 are categorical variables 
 
  77
6. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists and 
nurses) willing to respond to biological agent attacks within their local 
community?  
 
The percentage of Florida’s healthcare providers (HCPWLlocal) is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
7. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists and 
nurses) willing to respond to biological agent attacks outside their local 
community (Statewide)?  
 
The percentage of Florida’s healthcare providers (HCPWLStatewide) is presented in 
Chapter 4. 
 
8. Do demographic factors of Florida’s community healthcare providers 
(physicians, pharmacists and nurses) predict a biological terrorism overall level 
of preparedness?  
 
Logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the demographic factors 
predicted the preparedness level (PL) at significance level of .05 (α = .05). 
PL = β0 + β1x1+ β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 + β7x7 + β8x8 + β9x9 + β10x10 + 
β11x11 + β12x12 + β13x13 + ℮               (Model 3) 
 
β0: intercept of the model 
β1-13 : coefficient of each factor 
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x1 : age  
x2 : gender  
x3 : race 
x4 : highest educational degree 
x5 : years worked as licensed professional 
x6 : current position  
x7 : employment status 
x8 : feeling of being prepared 
x9 : zip code 
x10 : patient encounter volume 
x11 : city type 
x12 : population size 
x13 : workplace type 
Note: x1-13 are categorical variables 
 
 
9. Does the perceived benefit of bioterrorism preparedness training predict the 
overall level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
 
Logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the perceived benefits of 
bioterrorism preparedness training (PBT) predict the preparedness level (PL) at 
significance level of .05 (α = .05). 
PL = β0 + β1x1 + ℮   (Model 4) 
 
β0: intercept of the model 
β1: coefficient of perceived benefits factor 
x1 : Perceived benefits of bioterrorism training (PBT) 
Note: x1 is ordinal variables  
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10. Does the perceived threat that a provider's community is at real risk of a 
bioterrorism attack predict the overall level of preparedness of the healthcare 
providers?  
Logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the perceived threats of risks 
of a bioterrorism attack (PTR) predicted the overall preparedness level (PL) at 
significance level of .05 (α = .05). 
PL = β0 + β1x1 + ℮    (Model 5) 
 
β0: intercept of the model 
β1 : coefficient of perceived threats factor  
x1 : Perceived threats of bioterrorism attack in a local community (PTR) 
Note: x1 is ordinal variables 
 
 
11. Do the demographics, perceived threat of bioterrorism attack, perceived benefits 
of bioterrorism training, previous trainings, and previous drills predict the level 
of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
 
Logistic regression analysis was used to test whether the demographic factors, 
perceived threats and benefits, and previous training and drills predicted the 
preparedness level (PL) at significance level of .05 (α = .05). 
 
PL= β0 + β1x1+ β2x2 + β3x3 + β4x4 + β5x5 + β6x6 + β7x7 + β8x8 + β9x9 + β10x10 + 
β11x11 + β12x12 + β13x13 + β14x14 + β15x15 + β16x16 + β17x17 + ℮    (Model 6) 
 
β0: intercept of the model 
β1-17 : coefficient of each factor 
x1 : age  
x2 : gender  
x3 : race 
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x4 : highest educational degree 
x5 : years worked as licensed professional 
x6 : current position  
x7 : employment status 
x8 : feeling of being prepared 
x9 : zip code 
x10 : patient encounter volume 
x11 : city type 
x12 : population size 
x13 : workplace type 
x14 : Previous participation in preparedness drills (PPD) 
x15 : Previous participation in preparedness training (PPT) 
x16 : Perceived benefits of bioterrorism training (PBT) 
x17 : Perceived threats of bioterrorism attack in a local community (PTR) 
 
Note: x1-15 are categorical variables, x16 and x17 are ordinal variables (3-point and 
5-point Likert scale, respectively); the bold text represents the studied factors 
addressed in this question. 
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“… with terrorist groups today… we’re in a new era… where the 
unthinkable could be done with unthinkable destructive power by groups 
that are willing to do the unthinkable.” 
Senator Sam Nunn, 1996 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
RESULTS 
  
This chapter first discusses the distribution of the questionnaire, and the 
descriptions of the study subjects and their work place.  Second, it details the assessment 
of the healthcare providers’ competency levels and willingness to respond to determine 
the overall preparedness level of Florida healthcare providers.  Finally, it presents the 
findings of the predictive modeling of an individual’s overall preparedness level. 
 
Distribution of the Questionnaire 
Of 22,800 questionnaire invitations sent to Florida healthcare providers by e-mail, 
9,124 were assumed delivered, 13,676 mails were returned for reasons of an “unknown 
address”, “incorrect address” or were “blocked” by a spam filter.  There were 2,879 
healthcare providers from the 9,124 who received the e-mails that came to the study 
website and 2,279 opted into the study, which represent the study response rate of 
24.97% (2,279/9,124).   
The survey was opened for 7 days, from midnight Sunday until midnight of the 
following Saturday.  There was only one reminder sent out to all providers on Tuesday of 
that week.  From the 2,279 surveys that were started, 1,957 were completed (85.9%).  
Since the survey required the subjects to complete each question in sequence from 
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question 1 to 59, all question data were captured up to the point the subjects completed 
(n=1,957) or prematurely exited the survey (incomplete survey, n=349).   
 
Description of the Study Subjects 
The composition of the survey participants were majority nurses (n=1,152, 50.5%, 
see Table 4-1), but also included pharmacists (n=486, 21.3%), physicians (n=604, 
26.5%), and “others”, which the provider type could not be defined (i.e. professor, n=37, 
1.6%).  The greater part of the subjects were female (n=1,275, 58.3%) and most of the 
providers were within the 35 to 54 year age range (n=1,329, 60.5%). Only 55 (2.5%) 
African Americans and 139 (6.4%) Hispanics participated.  
 
Table 4-1 Florida Healthcare Providers’ Demographics 
 All Healthcare 
Providers (%) 
Physician (%) 
 
Nurse (%) 
 
Pharmacist (%) 
 
Others (%) 
 
Age (n=2,198) 
  18-34 
  35-54 
  >55 
 
371 (16.9) 
1,329 (60.5) 
498 (22.6) 
 
63 (10.4) 
345 (50.7) 
196 (32.5) 
 
163 (15.2) 
687 (64.0) 
223 (20.8) 
 
142 (29.2) 
276 (56.8) 
68 (14.0) 
 
3 (8.3) 
22 (61.1) 
11 (30.6) 
Gender (n=2,188) 
  Male 
  Female 
 
913 (41.7) 
1275 (58.3) 
 
483 (80.1) 
120 (19.9 
 
158 (14.9) 
905 (85.1) 
 
263 (54.1) 
223 (45.9) 
 
9 (25) 
27(75) 
Race (n=2,182) 
  African American 
  American Indian  
  Asian / Pacific Island 
  Caucasian  
  Hispanic 
  Other 
 
55 (2.5) 
8 (.4) 
108 (4.7) 
1801 (82.5) 
139 (6.4) 
71 (3.3) 
 
11 (1.8) 
4 (.7) 
39 (6.5)  
462 (76.6) 
60 (10) 
27 (4.5) 
 
21 (2) 
3 (.3) 
31 (2.9) 
944 (89.3) 
37 (3.5) 
21 (2) 
 
22 (4.5) 
1 (.2) 
38 (7.8)  
361 (74.3) 
41 (8.4) 
23 (4.7) 
 
1 (2.8) 
0 (0) 
0 (0)  
34 (94.4) 
1 (2.8) 
0 (0) 
Highest Degree 
(n=2,184) 
   Associate 
   Bachelor 
   Masters 
   Doctorate 
   Foreign Educated 
 
 
288 (13.2) 
544 (24.9) 
463 (21.2) 
852 (39) 
37 (1.7) 
 
 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
594 (98.5) 
9 (1.5) 
 
 
281 (26.5) 
302 (28.5) 
416 (39.3) 
38 (3.6) 
22 (2.1) 
 
 
0 (0) 
233 (48.1) 
34 (7.0) 
212 (43.6) 
6 (1.2) 
 
 
5 (13.9) 
8 (22.2) 
11 (30.6) 
12 (33.3) 
0 (0) 
Years of Work 
Experience  (n=2,168) 
  < 2 
  3 to 5 
  6 to 10 
  11 to 20 
  > 20 
 
 
76 (3.5) 
206 (9.5) 
323 (14.9) 
542 (25) 
1021(47) 
 
 
34 (5.6) 
52 (8.6) 
77 (12.8) 
156 (25.9) 
284 (47.1) 
 
 
22 (2.1) 
77 (7.4) 
146 (14) 
254 (24.4) 
544 (52.2) 
 
 
20 (4.1) 
75 (15.4) 
94 (19.3) 
120 (24.7) 
176 (36.2) 
 
 
0 (0) 
2 (5.6) 
6 (16.7) 
12 (33.3) 
16 (44.4) 
* N is based on the number of completion of each question 
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As expected, every subject had at least a two-year college degree (n=288, 13.2%), 
with the majority having doctorate degrees (DO, Ph.D., MD, PharmD, DDS, n=852, 
39.0%).  There were 32 (1.7%) foreign educated subjects.  While receiving good 
representation in all groupings, significant proportion of the most subjects had over 20 
years of work experience as a licensed provider (physicians, n=284, 47.1%, nurses, 
n=544, 52.2%, and pharmacists n=176, 36.2%). 
 
Description of the Subjects’ Work Place 
 Most of the subjects worked in a health care setting (n=1,863, 86.2%, see Table 4-
2), more precisely a hospital setting (hospital, none teaching n=470, 25.2% and teaching 
hospital n=331, 17.8%).  The only exception was the pharmacist.  While this subgroup 
had a large presence in hospitals (n=123, 28.4%), the primary work place was in a 
community pharmacy (n=197, 45.8%).  There were also a total of 230 (12.4%) retirees 
that participated in the survey.  While it was unknown whether the retirees continued to 
practice, this segment continued to echo the subject population at large in this study. 
There were not significant differences in the data examined. 
The majority of the subjects worked in an urban area (n=1,084, 50.9%), with a 
population base greater than 75,000 (large city, n=1,296, 61%).  The patient encounters 
of the subject’s workplace were normally less than 5,000 annually (558, 30.2%), with the 
exception of the pharmacist segmentation.  Its largest subgroup (n=76, 17.8%) received 
greater than 80,000 encounters yearly.  
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Table 4-2 Florida Healthcare Providers’ Work Place Demographics 
 All Healthcare 
Providers (%) 
 
Physician (%) 
 
Nurse (%) 
 
Pharmacist (%) 
 
Others (%) 
 
Work Place Setting 
(n=2,162) 
  Health Care 
  None Health Care 
  Unemployed 
 
 
1863 (86.2) 
179 (8.3) 
120 (5.6) 
 
 
530 (88) 
29 (4.8) 
43 (7.1) 
 
 
895 (86.1) 
91 (8.1) 
54 (5.2) 
 
 
431 (89) 
38 (7.9) 
15 (3.1) 
 
 
7 (19.4) 
21 (58.3) 
8 (22.3) 
Primarily Work Place  
(n=1,862) 
  Hospital, none Teaching 
  Teaching Hospital 
  Long-term Care Facility  
  Home Health Care 
  Private Single Practice 
  Private Multi- Physician 
Practice 
  Clinic Setting 
  Institutional Pharmacy 
  Community Pharmacy 
  University/Research 
  Retired 
 
 
470 (25.2) 
331 (17.8) 
47 (2.5) 
37 (2) 
145 (7.8) 
 
179 (9.6) 
158 (8.5) 
21 (1.1) 
197 (10.6) 
47 (2.5) 
230 (12.4) 
 
 
96 (18.1) 
108 (20.4) 
1 (.2) 
1 (.2) 
103 (19.5) 
 
107 (20.2) 
53 (10) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
14 (2.6) 
46 (8.7) 
 
 
295 (32.9) 
177 (19.8) 
30 (3.3) 
30 (3.3) 
42 (4.7) 
 
69 (7.7) 
88 (9.8) 
1 (.1) 
0 (0) 
28 (3.1) 
136 (15.2) 
 
 
76 (17.7) 
46 (10.7) 
16 (3.7) 
6 (1.4) 
0 (0) 
 
2 (.5) 
17 (4) 
20 (4.7) 
197 (45.8) 
2 (.5) 
48 (11.2) 
 
 
3 (42.9) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
3 (42.9) 
0 (0) 
Yearly Patient Encounters  
(n=1,848) 
  < 5000 
   5,000 - 9,999 
  10,000 -19,999 
   20,000 – 39,999 
   40,000 – 59,999 
   60,000 – 79,999 
   > 80,000 
   Not Applicable 
 
 
558 (30.2) 
291 (15.7) 
206 (11.1) 
202 (10.9) 
147 (8) 
83 (4.5) 
223 (9.8) 
138 (7.5) 
 
 
200 (38) 
99 (18.8) 
53 (10.1) 
49 (9.3) 
19 (3.6) 
17 (3.2) 
56 (10.6) 
34 (6.5) 
 
 
289 (32.5) 
139 (15.7) 
97 (10.9) 
97 (10.9) 
75 (8.4) 
43 (4.8) 
91 (10.2) 
57 (6.4) 
 
 
68 (16) 
51 (12) 
56 (13.1) 
53 (12.4) 
53 (12.4) 
22 (5.2) 
76 (17.8) 
47 (11) 
 
 
1 (14.3) 
2 (28.6) 
0 (0) 
3 (42.9) 
0 (0) 
1 (14.3) 
0 (0) 
0 (0) 
Community Type 
(n=2,128) 
   Rural 
   Urban 
   Suburban 
 
 
244 (11.5) 
1084 (50.9) 
800 (37.6) 
 
 
56 (9.5) 
310 (52.5) 
225 (38.1) 
 
 
125 (12.2) 
522 (50.9) 
379 (36.9) 
 
 
56 (11.8) 
229 (48.2) 
190 (40) 
 
 
7 (19.4) 
23 (63.9) 
6 (16.7) 
Population Size (n=2124) 
  Small City (< 25,000) 
  Med City (25,000 - 75,000) 
  Large City (> 75,000) 
 
213 (10) 
615 (29) 
1296 (61) 
 
44 (7.5) 
140 (23.7) 
406 (68.8) 
 
103 (10.1) 
332 (32.4) 
589 (57.5) 
 
63 (13.3) 
133 (28.1) 
278 (58.6) 
 
3 (8.3) 
10 (27.8) 
23 (63.9) 
* N is based on the number of completion of each question 
 
 
Assessment of the Provider’s Current Preparedness Levels 
According to the study’s conceptual model, the assessment of the provider’s 
current preparedness levels involved 4 steps.  First, it needed to determine the subject’s 
eight core administrative competencies (AC1-8) and the eight core clinical competencies 
(CC1-8) levels.  These findings could be used to determine which competency area in 
which an individual might have had a weakness, or an area which an organization may 
target for training of a group of providers. 
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Second, the weighted administrative competency level (ACL) and the weighted 
clinical competency level (CCL), which formed the weighted bioterrorism competency 
level (BCL), were calculated.  The BCL, in itself, indicated the provider’s individual 
overall bioterrorism competency level.  
Third, the provider’s willingness to respond to a statewide event was determined 
and assigned a score.  This score could be used to estimate a response rate (number of 
providers willing to respond divided by the local population of providers) of volunteer 
medical providers for pre-event planning activities.  
Finally, the BCL was matched with the provider’s willingness-to-respond rating 
to form the provider’s overall preparedness level (PL) score.  This score was used for the 
overall preparedness level of the providers.  The actual measurements for each of these 
processes (steps 1-4) are outlined in Chapter 3.  
 
 Determine the Providers’ Competency Levels (AC1-8 and CC1-8) 
 
Administrative Competencies (AC) 
Nurses (65.2%) had a higher administrative competency level than the physicians 
(59.1%) and pharmacists (54.9%) on the un-weighted administrative competencies. 
Further examination of the individual core administrative competencies revealed that 
healthcare providers as a whole are the most competent at demonstrating the correct use 
of communication equipment used for emergency communication (see Figure 4-1, AC5, 
all 72.7%, physicians 76.3%, nurses 74.3%, and pharmacists 66.2%), and being able to 
describe his/her functional role(s) in emergency response, and partaking in these role(s) 
during regular drills (AC4, , all 70.1%, physicians 72.3%, nurses 69.3%, and pharmacists 
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70.1%). The survey findings, shown on Table 4-3, also suggests that the subjects could 
problem solve creatively and apply flexible thinking to unusual challenges within his/her 
functional responsibilities during a response to a bioterrorism event (AC8 , all 70.6%, 
physicians 71.3%, nurses 66.5%, and pharmacists 78.5%).  
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Figure 4-1. Provider Administrative Competency Levels for Bioterrorism Preparedness. 
 
 
Overall, physicians and pharmacists were the weakest at identifying limits to own 
knowledge, skill, and authority, and identify key system resources for referring matters 
that exceed these limits (AC7, physicians 45.2% and pharmacists 24.7%). The nurses’ 
weakest competency was their lack of knowledge of his/her work place’s role in an 
emergency response (AC1, 51.9%). 
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Table 4-3. Administrative Competency Levels of Florida Healthcare Providers 
 All Healthcare Providers (%) 
 
Physician (%) 
 
Nurse (%) 
 
Pharmacist (%) 
 
AC1 47.7 46.8 51.9 40.3 
AC2 56.1 47.6 64.6 49.3 
AC3 57.1 47.6 68.2 46.3 
AC4 70.1 72.3 69.3 70.1 
AC5 72.7 76.3 74.3 66.2 
AC6 67.7 65.3 70.5 64.1 
AC7 46.1 45.2 56.6 24.7 
AC8 70.6 71.3 66.5 78.5 
AC1: Describe your work place’s role in an emergency response.  
AC2: Identify the chain of command in emergency response. 
AC3: Identify and locate the agency’s emergency management plan. 
AC4: Describe his/her functional role(s) in emergency response and participate in these role(s) during regular drills. 
AC5: Demonstrate the correct use of communication equipment used for emergency communication. (phone, fax, 
radio, satellite phone) 
AC6: Ability to locate the communication role(s) in the emergency response plan and understand his/her role. 
AC7: Identify limits to own knowledge, skill, and authority, and identify key system resources for referring matters 
that exceed these limits. 
AC8: Demonstrates creative problem solving and flexible thinking to unusual challenges within his/her functional 
responsibilities to respond to a bioterrorism event. 
 
Clinical Competencies (CC) 
 Physicians (48.9%) had a higher competency level than the nurses (44.9%) and 
pharmacists (37.0%) on the un-weighted clinical competencies. As Figure 4.2 
demonstrates, the clinical competency set has more deficits than the administrative core 
competency set. The clinical competencies examined skills not afforded by normal job 
duties such as using a fax, and involve specialized bioterrorism training.   
The all provider clinical competency level for the eight individual un-weighted 
competencies range from the low of 17.9% (CC5, see Table 4-4),   the ability to initiate 
patient care within his/her professional scope of practice and arrange for prompt referral 
appropriate to the identified condition(s), to the high of 73.9% (CC1), the ability to 
describe his/her expected clinical role in bioterrorism response for the specific practice 
setting as a part of the institution or community response.  
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Figure 4-2. Provider Clinical Competency Levels for Bioterrorism Preparedness. 
 
Within the provider subgroups, physicians and pharmacists were the most 
competent at CC1 and CC2, the ability to respond to an emergency within the emergency 
management system of his/her practice, institution and community (CC1, 76.5% and 
73.3%, and CC2, 76.5% and 71.6%, respectively). The nurses were also the most 
competent at CC1 (72.5%) and showed a strength in CC4 (67.8%), the ability to report 
identified cases or events to the public health authorities to facilitate surveillance and 
investigation using the established institutional or local communication protocol.  
As with the all provider competency level, the provider subgroups all demonstrated 
the lowest competency level in CC5 (physician 25.7%, nurse 17.4% and pharmacist 
9.2%). Physicians demonstrated deficits in their ability to communicate risks and actions 
taken to patients and concerned others clearly and accurately (CC6, 29.1%) and in their 
ability to recognize an illness or injury as potentially resulting from exposure to a 
biological, chemical or radiological agent possibly associated with a terrorist event 
(CC3, 34.6%). The nurses also have major deficits in CC3 (18.4%) and CC6 (22.3%). 
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Additionally, nurses report difficulty in the recognition of unusual events that might 
indicate an emergency and describe appropriate action (CC8, 37.3%). The pharmacist 
subgroup’s main deficit was CC5 (9.2%). Other deficits included CC3 (17.3%), CC6 
(15.9%), CC8 (29.5%), and CC7 (24.7%), the ability to recognize and manage the 
psychological impact of a Bioterrorism event on victims and healthcare professionals. 
 
Table 4-4. Clinical Competency Levels of Florida Healthcare Providers 
 All Healthcare Providers (%) 
 
Physician (%) 
 
Nurse (%) 
 
Pharmacist (%) 
 
CC1 73.9 76.5 72.5 73.3 
CC2 70.5 76.5 67.2 71.6 
CC3 22.6 34.5 18.4 17.3 
CC4 61.4 56.4 67.8 54.6 
CC5 17.9 25.7 17.4 9.2 
CC6 22.8 29.1 22.3 15.9 
CC7 46.1 45.2 56.6 24.7 
CC8 38.4 47.3 37.3 29.5 
CC1: Describe his/her expected clinical role in bioterrorism response for the specific practice setting as a part of 
the institution or community response. 
CC2: Respond to an emergency within the emergency management system of his/her practice, institution and 
community. 
CC3: Recognize an illness or injury as potentially resulting from exposure to a biological, chemical or 
radiological agent possibly associated with a terrorist event. 
CC4: Ability to report identified cases or events to the public health authorities to facilitate surveillance and 
investigation using the established institutional or local communication protocol 
CC5: Initiate patient care within his/her professional scope of practice and arrange for prompt referral 
appropriate to the identified condition(s). 
CC6: Communicate risks and actions taken to patients and concerned others clearly and accurately. 
CC7: Recognize and manage the psychological impact of a Bioterrorism event on victims and health care 
professionals, as appropriate to the event. 
CC8: Recognize unusual events that might indicate an emergency and describe appropriate action. 
 
 Administrative Competency Level (ACL) 
 To calculate the weighted Administrative Competency Level (ACL), the 
administrative competency results (AC1-8) above were placed in the following formula: 
 
ACL = (0.103*AC1) + (0.126*AC2) + (0.103*AC3) + (0.159*AC4) + 
(0.153*AC5) + (0.062*AC6) + (0.103*AC7) + (0.191*AC8) 
 
ACL = 0.6284 
   
 Note: The descriptions of ACL and AC1-8 are found in Chapter 3. 
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This resulted in a mean score of 0.6284.  This mean score average suggests that 62.84% 
of subjects are competent in the administrative core competencies, and that on average 
each subject is competent in 62.84% of the overall core administrative competencies. 
 
Clinical Competency Level (CCL) 
 
To calculate the Clinical Competency Level (CCL), the clinical competency results 
(CC1-8) above were placed in the following formula: 
 
CCL = (0.113*CC1) + (0.118*CC2) + (0.153*CC3) + (0.11*CC4) + 
(0.129*CC5) + (0.131*CC6) + (0.106*CC7) + (0.14*CC8)  
 
CCL = 0.4497 
Note: The descriptions of CCL and CC1-8 are found in Chapter 3. 
This resulted in a mean score of 0.4497.  This mean score average suggests that 44.97% 
of subjects are competent in the clinical core competencies, and that on average each 
subject is competent in 44.97% of the overall core administrative competencies. 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3. Weighted Bioterrorism Competency Levels Scores for Florida’s Healthcare 
Providers. 
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Bioterrorism Competency Level (BCL) 
To calculate the Bioterrorism Competency Level (BCL), the results from both the 
ACL and BCL above were placed in the following formula: 
 
BCL = (0.364*ACL) + (0.636*CCL) 
 
BCL = .5117 
 
Note: The descriptions of BCL are found in Chapter 3. 
 
This resulted in a mean score of 0.5117.  This weighted mean score average suggests that 
51.2% of the subjects have the necessary competency level to respond to a bioterrorist 
attack, and that on average each subject is 51.2% competent in the core bioterrorism 
competencies. 
 
Willingness-to-Respond 
The willingness-to-respond score is segmented into proximities and risk levels. 
Both factors are important for pre-incident planning of personnel expectations. Within 
this section, results of Research Questions 6 and 7 are presented. 
 
Willingness to Respond to an event within their local community 
Research Question 6. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, 
pharmacists and nurses) willing to respond to biological agent attacks within their local 
community?  
 
The study results suggest that most Florida providers are willing to respond to both 
a high risk (HR) event and a low risk (LR) event within their local community (81.7% 
and 82.8%, respectively). Physicians are the most likely to respond to a HR event in the 
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local community (84.5%) and have the tendency to report a higher willingness to respond 
in a HR event than a LR event, unlike the other professions. Nurses are the most likely in 
a LR event (83.6%) in the local community. Pharmacist are the least likely to respond in 
all proximity categories (see Table 4-5).  
 
Table 4-5. Percentage of Florida Healthcare Providers Willing-to-Respond to a 
Bioterrorism Attack 
All Healthcare Providers Physician Nurse Pharmacist  
 
Proximity 
n=1961 
High Risk Low Risk High 
Risk 
Low 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Low 
Risk 
High 
Risk 
Low 
Risk 
Local  81.7 82.8 84.5 83.3 81.6 83.6 79.1 80.7 
Regional 64.4 68.1 66.5 65.9 65.5 70.4 59.5 64.6 
Statewide 53.6 53.8 55.0 51.7 56.9 56.7 45.0 47.0 
Nationwide 48.2 47.0 51.9 46.1 47.3 48.9 45.5 44.5 
* The total n does not include the “others” category of provider. 
High Risk Event was defined as a bioterrorism agent that does NOT have a known treatment and/or vaccination. 
Low Risk Event was defined as a bioterrorism agent that has a known treatment and/or vaccination. 
Proximity was defined as the distance from providers’ normal workplace to Ground Zero of the event. 
Local was defined as the providers’ local community. 
Regional was defined as counties surrounding the providers’ normal workplace. 
Statewide was defined as responding anywhere in the State of Florida. 
Nationwide was defined as responding anywhere in the United States. 
 
Willingness to Respond to an event outside their local community 
Research Question 7. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, 
pharmacists and nurses) willing to respond to biological agent attacks outside their local 
community (Statewide)?  
 
When asked if Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists 
and nurses) were willing to respond to biological agent attacks outside their local 
community, all subject group percentages dropped dramatically (see Table 4-5). Within 
the statewide subgroup, only 53.6% of all subjects reported that they are willing to 
respond to a HR event (physicians 55.0%, nurses 56.9% and pharmacists 45.0%).  It was 
also reported that only 48.2% of Florida’s community providers are willing to respond to 
a HR event and 47.0% to a LR event outside Florida.  
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Provider Preparedness Level (PL) 
 
 
 
Figure 4-4. The Scored Conceptual Model for Bioterrorism Preparedness. 
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Research Question 1. Are Florida’s community healthcare providers (physicians, 
pharmacists and nurses) prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack? 
 
Overall, 67.5% of the Florida healthcare providers were not prepared for a 
bioterrorism attack.  As identified by the BCL (see Figure 4-3), 51.1% of subjects have 
the minimal competencies needed to respond to a biological attack and 53.7% are willing 
to respond  within the State of Florida (see Table 4-5).  When the process of matching 
was applied to the subjects, only 32.5% (34.6% physicians, 38.4% nurses, and 17.4% 
pharmacist, see Table 4-4) of Florida’s community healthcare providers had both a 
minimal level of competency to effectively function without endangering him/herself and 
others, and are willing to respond to a bioterrorism attack.  
 
Table 4-6. Preparedness Levels of Florida Healthcare Providers 
  Overall Preparedness 
Provider Type 
 
Not Prepared (%) 
 
Prepared (%) 
Physician N=537  
 
351(65.4%)  186 (34.6%) 
  
Nurse N=916 
 
564 (61.6%) 
  
352 (38.4%) 
  
Pharmacist N=436 
 
360 (82.6%) 
  
76 (17.4%) 
  
FL Healthcare Providers N=1889 
 
1275 (67.5%) 
  
614 (32.5%) 
  
              * The total n does not include the “others” category. 
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Research Question 2. Are the levels of preparedness to respond to a bioterrorism attack 
different among physicians, pharmacists, and nurses?  
 
 
Pharmacists seemed to be less prepared than physicians and nurses (17.4% vs. 
34.6%, 38.4%, see Figure 4-5).  A Pearson Chi-Square test of the percent preparedness of 
all three groups was performed. It showed that there was at least a significant difference 
between the levels of preparedness of a pair comparison (Pearson Chi-Square =60.916, 
df= 2, p=.000).       
The researcher conducted a family-wise comparisons (alpha = .017) of the 
preparedness levels between provider types to identify the different.   There were 
statistically significant differences of the levels of preparedness between physician and 
pharmacist groups (34.6% vs. 17.4%, Pearson Chi-Square=36.203, df=1, p=.000) and 
between nurse and pharmacist groups (38.4% vs. 17.4%, Pearson Chi-Squre = 60.193, 
df=1, p=.000).  There was no significant difference between physicians and nurses 
(34.6% vs. 38.4%, Pearson Chi-Square = 2.087, df=1, p=.159).    
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Figure 4-5. Overall Bioterrorism Preparedness Level (PL) by Provider Type. 
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Research Question 3. Do Florida’ healthcare providers (physicians, pharmacists and 
nurses) “Feel” prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack? 
 
The findings suggest that 55.5% (n=1957) of Florida’s community healthcare 
providers do NOT feel prepared (physicians n=545, 41.7%, nurses n= 943, 55.4%, and 
pharmacists n=439, 72.4%) and 41.5% feel somewhat prepared (physicians 51.6%, 
nurses 42.5%, and pharmacists 27.1%) to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack (see 
Figure 4-6). Only 3.0 of Florida’s providers feel very prepared (physicians 6.8%, nurses 
2.1%, and pharmacists 0.5%). 
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Figure 4-6. Percentage of Providers that “Feel” Prepared. 
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The Work Place Emergency Plan 
The findings suggest that 70% (physicians 68.9%, nurses 83.1%, and pharmacists 
60.5%, see Figure 4-7) of Florida’s community healthcare providers know if their work 
place has an emergency plan. Of those, only 52.9% (physicians 46.2%, nurses 60.3%, and 
pharmacists 44.9%) know where it is located.  
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
%
Provider Type
Workplace has a plan
Knows location 
Reviewed plan in last 12 months
Know role according to plan
Has special organization structure (i.e. ICS)
Plan specifically addresses bioterrorism
Plan specifically addresses emergency
communications
Workplace has a plan 73.7 68.9 83.1 60.5
Knows location 52.9 46.2 60.3 44.9
Reviewed plan in last 12 months 41.3 31.6 49.7 34.4
Know role according to plan 49.6 45.4 56.1 40.7
Has special organization structure (i.e.
ICS)
55.9 53 62.2 46.3
Plan specifically addresses bioterrorism 39.5 41.9 43 29
Plan specifically addresses emergency
communications
54.6 50 61.2 45.7
All Providers Physicians Nurses Pharmacists
 
Figure 4-7. Provider’s Knowledge of a Work Place Emergency Plan and It’s Contents 
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Emergency Preparedness Drills 
The findings suggest that 31.5% (physicians 25.4%, nurses 40.5%, and pharmacists 
20.1%, see Figure 4-8) of Florida’s community healthcare providers had participated in 
an emergency drill in the last 12 months. Of those, only 11.1% (physicians 10.3%, nurses 
13.5%, and pharmacists 6.6%) have participated in a bioterrorism themed drill.  
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Figure 4-8. Provider’s Participation in an Emergency Preparedness Drills 
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Emergency Preparedness Training Activities 
The findings suggest that 55.2% (physicians 33.2%, nurses 66.7%, and pharmacists 
33.2%, see Figure 4-9) of Florida’s community healthcare providers have participated in 
an emergency training sometime during their career. Of those, only 11.1% (physicians 
26.5%, nurses 36.9%, and pharmacists 22%) have participated in training within the 
previous 12 months and 32.3% stated that the training included a chemical or biological 
components. 32.4% of the providers stated that the training focused specifically to a 
biological agent exposure. 
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Figure 4-9. Provider’s Emergency Preparedness Training Activities 
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Method / Modality of Bioterrorism Training Received  
The providers reported that 54% received their training in a traditional lecture 
format and that 21% used self learn materials (see Figure 4-10). The providers also 
suggested that traditional lecture format (44%) is the preferred choice to obtain future 
bioterrorism trainings, with online interactive courses (30%) being the next preferred. 
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Figure 4-10. Types of Bioterrorism Training Methods/ Modalities for Providers  
 
Previous Trainings  Preferred Trainings  
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Perceived Benefits of Bioterrorism Training (PBT) 
When ask how important is it for you to be trained to identify a possible 
bioterrorism attack, 46% of the providers reported that it was very important, 50% stated 
it was important and 4% believed it was not important (see Figure 4-11). 
  
Very Important
46%
Important
50%
Not Important
4%
 
Figure 4-11. The Providers’ Perceived Benefits of Bioterrorism Training (PBT) 
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Perceived Threats of the Risk of a Bioterrorism Attack  
When ask if a bioterrorism attack is a real threat within Florida, 86.4% of the 
providers either strongly agreed or agreed. When ask if a bioterrorism attack is a real 
threat within your local community, this percentage dropped to 59.8% that either strongly 
agreed or agreed, with 40.2% either being neutral or disagreeing. (Figure 4-12). 
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Figure 4-11. The Providers Perceived Threats of the Risk of a Bioterrorism Attack at the 
State and Local Levels 
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Predictive Factors of Provider Preparedness Levels 
Research Question 4. Do previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict 
the overall level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
 
The dependent variable is PL.  If healthcare providers were prepared PL=1, 
otherwise PL=0(not prepared).  Since the dependent variable is discrete, the ordinary 
least squares regression can be used to fit a linear probability model.  However, since the 
linear probability model is heteroskedastic and may predict probability values beyond the 
(0,1) range, the logistic regression model is used to estimate the factors which influence 
the overall preparedness. 
 
Table 4-7 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Logistic Regression Model for 
Question 4. 
Variable Frequency (%) 
Overall preparedness N=1,919 
          Not prepared (0) 
          Prepared (1) 
 
1,298 (67.6) 
621 (32.4) 
Previous Drills N=2,071 
          Yes (1) 
          No (2) 
 
653 (31.5) 
1,418(68.5) 
Previous Trainings N=2,068 
         Yes (1) 
         No (2) 
 
1,141(55.2) 
927 (44.8) 
 
 
Table 4-8 Logistic Regression Significant Results for Question 4 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Disaster Drills (yes) .941 .114 68.096 1 .000 2.562
Participated in Disaster Training (yes) 1.049 .117 79.915 1 .000 2.856
Constant -1.696 .093 335.535 1 .000 .183
 
 
Table 4-9 Model Summary for Question 4 
Step -2 Log  
Likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 217.838 .120 .167 
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Table 4-10 Model Prediction for Question 4 
 
Predicted 
Overall Preparedness 
 
 
Observed Not 
Prepared 
Prepared 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1097 201 84.5 
  Prepared 336 285 45.9 
 Overall %    72.0 
Note: The Cut Value is 0.500 
 
 
The results from logistic regression indicate that previous trainings (beta = .1049, 
p=.000) and drills (beta = .941, p=.000) were significant predictors of the overall 
preparedness level of Florida healthcare providers at 0.05 level.(Table 4-8)  By using 
logistic regression analysis, beta is the regression coefficient of logarithm of the 
likelihood of preparedness  
 
 Log odds of being prepared= log         probability of being prepared 
                          1- probability of being unprepared 
 
 
In order to interpret the results, exponential function of beta of each independent 
variable is used as a regression coefficient to predict preparedness (prepared vs. not 
prepared).  If a healthcare provider has previous drills, they are 2.56 times likely to be 
prepared for a bioterrorism attack compared with no previous drills.  Similarly, if a 
healthcare provider has previous drills, they are 2.86 times likely to be prepared for a 
bioterrorism attack compared with no previous trainings.  The ability of variance of PL 
explained by this model is low (Nagelkerke R square = .167, see Table 4-9).  However, 
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the model predicts 74% of the responses correctly, see Table 4-10).   The preparedness of 
the healthcare providers on a bioterrorism attack event is multifaceted and complex.  It is 
not expected that only previous trainings and drills would have high R square.  The 
predictive model is substituted below. 
 
logPL = -.1696+ 0.941 x1 +0.1049 x2 + ℮                       (Model 1) 
 
 
Research Question 5. Do previous emergency preparedness trainings and drills predict 
the Florida’s healthcare providers’ willingness to respond to a biological terrorism 
attack within the State of Florida?  
 
The results from logistic regression indicate that previous trainings (beta = .286, 
p=.010) and drills (beta = .436, p=.000) were significant predictors of the willingness to 
respond of Florida healthcare providers (see Table 4-11).  The researcher used the 
exponential function of betas to interpret the prediction of the overall preparedness with 
similar reasons listed in question 4.  If the healthcare providers had previous drills, they 
were 1.55 times more likely to be willingness to respond to a bioterrorism attack 
compared with no previous drills.  If the healthcare providers had previous trainings, they 
were 1.33 times more likely to be willingness to respond to a bioterrorism attack 
compared with no previous trainings.  The ability of variance explained by this model is 
low (Nagelkerke R square = .027, see Table 4-12).  However, the model predicts 55.8% 
of the responses correctly (see Table 4-13). The willingness to respond to a bioterrorism 
attack of the healthcare providers is multifaceted and complex.  It is not expected that 
only previous trainings and drills would highly predict the willingness to respond.  There 
is no constant included in the model (p=.105).  The predictive model is substituted with 
the regression coefficients below. 
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Log HCPWLstatewide = β0 + 0.436x1+ 0.286x2 + ℮         (Model 2) 
Table 4-11 Descriptive Statistics of the Variables in the Logistic Regression Model for 
Question 5. 
Variable Frequency (%) 
Willingness to Response (Statewide) 
level N=1,556 
          No (0) 
          Yes (1) 
 
 
713(45.8) 
843 (54.2) 
Previous Drills N=2,071 
          Yes (1) 
          No (2) 
 
653 (31.5) 
1,418(68.5) 
Previous Trainings N=2,068 
         Yes (1) 
         No (2) 
 
1,141(55.2) 
927 (44.8) 
 
 
Table 4-12 Logistic Regression Significant Results for Question 5 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Disaster Drills (yes) .431 .120 13.208 1 .000 1.547
Participated in Disaster Training (yes) .286 .111 6.647 1 .010 1.331
Constant -.125 .077 2.630 1 .105 .883
 
 
Table 4-13 Model Summary for Question 5 
Step -2 Log  
Likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 211.453 .020 .027 
 
 
Table 4-14 Model Prediction for Question 5 
 
Predicted 
WTR Statewide 
 
 
Observed Not Willing Willing 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 WTR Statewide Not Willing 321 392 45.0 
  Willing 298 548 65.0 
 Overall %    55.8 
Note: The Cut Value is 0.500 and WTR = Willingness to Respond 
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Research Question 8. Do demographic factors of Florida’s community healthcare 
providers (physicians, pharmacists and nurses) predict a biological terrorism overall 
level of preparedness?  
 
The researcher selected the model of the regression analysis in step 5, which was the 
final step of the regression analysis using the backward elimination method. The results 
from logistic regression show that gender (male, beta=.280, p=. 042), city type (rural, 
beta=.416, p=.020), current position (physician, beta=-1.992, p=.033), and primary work 
place (home health care, private single practice setting, or  private multi-physician 
practice beta= -1.396,-.705,-.908, p=.007, .005, .000, respectively) were significant 
predictors of overall preparedness of the Florida’s healthcare providers (see Table 4-15).  
If the healthcare providers were male, they were 1.32 times more likely to be prepared for 
the bioterrorism attack than female.  If the healthcare providers worked in a rural area, 
they were 1.52 times more likely to be prepared for the bioterrorism attack than in a 
suburban area.  If the healthcare providers were physicians or pharmacists, they were less 
likely to be prepared for the bioterrorism attack than providers in academia (i.e. 
professors). If the healthcare provider’s primary work place was home health care, a 
private single practice setting, or a private multi-physician practice, they were less likely 
to be prepared for the bioterrorism attack than a retiree. The ability of variance explained 
by this model is moderate (Nagelkerke R square = .107, see Table 4-16). However, the 
model predicts 67.7% of the responses correctly (see Table 4-17).  There might be other 
variables that were not measured in this study that predict the preparedness for a 
bioterrorism attack of the Florida healthcare providers.  The predictive model is 
substituted below. 
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Log PL = - .280x2_male -1.992x6_1  -2.577x6_3 -.037x8_4  -.705x8_5 -.908x8_6 + 
.416x11_1  + ℮               (Model 3) 
 
 
Table 4-15 Logistic Regression of Significant Results for Question 8 
Variable B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp (B)
Gender (male) .280 .137 4.148 1 .042 1.323 
City type 
    rural 
 
.416  
 
.178
6.480 
5.449 
2 
1 
.039 
.020 
 
1.516 
Current position 
    physician 
    pharmacist 
  
-1.992
-2.577
 
.934
.935
33.408
4.548 
7.604 
3 
1 
1 
.000 
.033 
.006 
 
.136 
.076 
Work duties 
    home health care 
    private practice 
    private multi-physician practice
  
-1.396
-.705 
-.908 
  
.516
.251
.242
37.622
7.334 
7.912 
14.121
10
1 
1 
1 
.000 
.007 
.005 
.000 
  
.248 
.494 
.403 
 
 
Table 4-16 Model Summary for Question 8 
Step -2 Log  
Likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 198.629 .084 .117 
2 198.673 .084 .117 
3 198.938 .083 .115 
4 199.299 .081 .112 
5 200.012 .077 .107 
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Table 4-17 Model Prediction for Question 8 
 
Predicted 
Overall Preparedness 
 
 
Observed Not 
Prepared 
Prepared 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1097 201 84.5 
  Prepared 336 285 45.9 
 Overall %    72.0 
Step 2 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1060 54 95.2 
  Prepared 480 80 14.3 
 Overall %    68.1 
Step 3 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1055 59 94.7 
  Prepared 479 81 14.5 
 Overall %    67.9 
Step 4 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1058 56 95.0 
  Prepared 483 77 13.8 
 Overall %    67.8 
Step 5 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1061 53 95.2 
  Prepared 488 72 12.9 
 Overall %    67.7 
Note: The Cut Value is 0.500 
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Research Question 9. Does the perceived benefit of bioterrorism preparedness training 
predict the overall level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
 
The results from the logistic regression show that perceived benefits of training was 
significant predictors of the overall preparedness level of Florida’s community healthcare 
providers (beta = -2.158, p=.000 for “no perceived benefits”, Table 4-18).  If the 
healthcare providers did not perceived benefits of bioterrorism training, they are less 
likely to be prepared for bioterrorism attack. The ability of variance explained by this 
model is low (Nagelkerke R square = .024, see Table 4-19).  However, the model predicts 
67.6% of the responses correctly (see Table 4-20).  The preparedness of Florida’s 
community healthcare providers for a bioterrorism attack event is considered 
multifaceted and complex.  It is not expected that only the perception of benefits of 
bioterrorism training would have high R square.  The model is substituted below. 
 
PL =-1.786 – 2.158 X1  +℮   (Model 4) 
  
Table 4-18 Logistic Regression Significant Results for Question 9 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Participated in Disaster Training (yes) -2.158 .516 17.458 1 .000 .116
Constant -1.768 .258 46.879 1 .000 .171
 
 
Table 4-19 Model Summary for Question 9 
Step -2 Log  
Likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 238.324 .017 .024 
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Table 4-20 Model Prediction for Question 9 
 
Predicted 
Overall Preparedness 
 
 
Observed Not 
Prepared 
Prepared 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1298 0 100 
  Prepared 621 0 0 
 Overall %    67.7 
Note: The Cut Value is 0.500 
 
Research Question 10. Does the perceived threat that a provider's community is at real 
risk of a bioterrorism attack predict the overall level of preparedness of the healthcare 
providers? 
 
The results from the logistic regression show that perceived threats of bioterrorism 
attack in the community was significant predictors of the overall preparedness level of 
Florida healthcare providers (beta = -.224, p=.026 for “no perceived threats”, see Tables 
4-21).  If the healthcare providers did not perceive threats of bioterrorism attack in the 
local community, they are less likely to be prepared for the bioterrorism attack.  The 
ability of variance explained by this model is low (Nagelkerke R square = .004, see Table 
4-22). However, the model predicts 67.6% of the responses correctly (see Table 4-23). It 
is not expected that only the perception of threats of bioterrorism attack in local 
communities would have high R square.  The predictive model is substituted below. 
 
Log PL =  -.651 -.224x1 + ℮    (Model 5) 
 
 
Table 4-21 Logistic Regression Significant Results for Question 10 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B) 
Perceived Threat (yes) -.224 .101 4.943 1 .026 .799 
Constant -.651 .062 110.184 1 .000 .522 
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Table 4-22 Model Summary for Question 10 
Step -2 Log  
Likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 241.126 .003 .004 
 
 
Table 4-23 Model Prediction for Question 10 
 
Predicted 
Overall Preparedness 
 
 
Observed Not 
Prepared 
Prepared 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
1298 0 100 
  Prepared 621 0 0 
 Overall %    67.7 
Note: The Cut Value is 0.500 
 
 
Research Question 11. Do the demographics, perceived threat of bioterrorism attack, 
perceived benefits of bioterrorism training, previous trainings, and previous drills predict 
the level of preparedness of the healthcare providers? 
 
The researcher selected the model of the regression analysis in step 9, which was the 
final step of the regression analysis using backward elimination method. The results from 
logistic regression show that race (1, beta=-.965, p=. 000 and 4, beta=-1.383, p=.002), 
perceived benefit (beta=2.425, p=.001), previous drills (beta=.689, p=.000), previous 
training (beta= .459, p=.002), and feeling not prepared (beta = -3.201, p=.000) were 
significant predictors of overall preparedness of the Florida healthcare providers (see 
Table 4-27).  If the healthcare providers were Caucasian, Asian/ Pacific Islander, or just 
felt unprepared, they are less likely to be prepared for the bioterrorism attack.  On the 
other hand, if healthcare providers have a perception of threats of bioterrorism attack, 
perceive benefits of bioterrorism training, had previous drills and trainings, they are more 
likely to be prepared.  The ability of variance explained by this model is moderate 
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(Nagelkerke R square = .370, see Table 4-28). However, the model predicts 76.9% of the 
responses correctly, see Table 4-29).  The preparedness of the healthcare providers on a 
bioterrorism attack event is multifaceted and complex.  There might be other variables 
that were not measured in this study predict the preparedness to a bioterrorism attack of 
the Florida healthcare providers.  The predictive model is substituted below. 
 
Log PL =  -.950x3(1) -1.383x3(4) + 2.425x43  + .689x21_1 +.459x23_1  - 3.201x58_1 -
1.459x58_2 + ℮ 
 
Table 4-24 Logistic Regression Significant Results for Question 11 
 B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
Race 
Caucasian 
Asian / Pacific Islander 
 
-.950 
-1.383 
 
.334
.438
13.342 
8.073 
9.980 
5 
1 
1 
.02 
.004
.002
 
.387 
.251 
Perceived benefits 2.425 .761 10.146 1 .001 11.307 
Previous drills .689 .137 25.227 1 .000 1.991 
Previous trainings .459 .147 9.728 1 .002 1.583 
Feeling Prepared 
Not Prepared 
Somewhat Prepared 
 
-3.201 
-1.459 
 
.404
.389
178.467 
62.855 
14.060 
2 
1 
1 
.000
.000
.000
 
.041 
.233 
 
 
Table 4-25 Model Summary for Question 11 
Step -2 Log  
Likelihood 
Cox & Snell 
R Square 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
1 158.125 .281 .389 
2 158.174 .280 .389 
3 158.483 .279 .387 
4 158.513 .279 .387 
5 158.793 .278 .385 
6 159.824 .273 .379 
7 160.557 .270 .375 
8 161.248 .267 .370 
9 161.381 .266 .370 
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Table 4-26 Model Prediction for Question 11 
 
Predicted 
Overall Preparedness 
 
 
Observed Not 
Prepared 
Prepared 
Percentage 
Correct 
Step 1 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
954 157 85.9 
  Prepared 214 346 61.8 
 Overall %    77.8 
Step 2 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
953 158 85.8 
  Prepared 215 345 61.6 
 Overall %    77.7 
Step 3 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
953 158 85.8 
  Prepared 214 346 61.8 
 Overall %    77.7 
Step 4 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
951 160 85.6 
  Prepared 214 346 61.8 
 Overall %    77.6 
Step 5 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
953 158 85.8 
  Prepared 215 345 61.6 
 Overall %    77.7 
Step 6 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
952 159 85.7 
  Prepared 219 341 60.9 
 Overall %    77.4 
Step 7 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
948 163 85.3 
  Prepared 218 342 61.1 
 Overall %    77.2 
Step 8 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
943 168 84.9 
  Prepared 210 350 62.5 
 Overall %    77.4 
Step 9 Overall 
Preparedness 
Not 
Prepared 
937 174 84.3 
  Prepared 212 348 62.1 
 Overall %    76.9 
Note: The Cut Value is 0.500 
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“Genetic Engineering for Biological Agents? There’d be No Protection. 
These are the Weapons of the Future and the Future is Coming Closer 
and Closer.” 
 
William Cohen, US Secretary of Defense, 1998
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CHAPTER 5 
DISSCUSION 
 
 This study was designed to assess Florida’s community healthcare providers’ 
clinical and administrative competencies to manage a bioterrorism attack, assess their 
willingness to response to a biological terrorism attack within the State of Florida, and 
assess their current level of overall preparedness to identify and manage a biological 
terrorism attack. This chapter provides discussions on the study results, methodology, and 
its’ limitations. 
 
Evaluation of the Demographic Factors 
Most of the study subject were between the ages of 35 and 54 years old (15%, see 
Table 4-17). Since the largest licensed provider group in Florida are registered nurses, the 
majority of the study participants were nurses (50.5%) and Florida’s smallest licensed 
provider group are the pharmacists and their participation was also reflective (21.3%). 
There were more female (58.3%) respondents than males (41.7%). This was probably 
based on the larger representation of the nurses within the study. Nurses are still majority 
female.  
The greater part of the subjects was Caucasian (82.5%), followed by the Hispanics 
(6.4%). There were only 48 (2.5%) African Americans, 108 (4.7%) Asians / Pacific 
Islanders, and 7 (0.4%) American Indians. The researcher was unable to find the 
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population percentages of minorities practicing in Florida to compare whether the 
minority groupings were accurately represented. The reasons for a lower participation 
among African Americans are unknown.  
Most of the subjects have a Doctorate degree (39%) and have been working as a 
licensed professional over 20 years (47%). The majority of the providers are currently 
working in a healthcare setting (82.6%) with 5.6% of the subjects were unemployed at 
the time of the study. The primary workplace for the providers was in a hospital setting 
and with less than 5000 patient encounters yearly. 50.9 % of the subject worked in an 
urban area with a population base over 75,000. 
 Overall, with the possible exception of the African American race grouping, the 
study has a good representation of Florida’s healthcare providers and the population as a 
whole. 
 
The Questionnaire 
 The study questionnaire, with a response rate of 25%, is relatively comparable 
with other studies using a mail/web survey (72).  The choice of an email/ web survey was 
beneficial to the researcher because it was less expensive than a traditional mail survey, it 
was time efficient for both the researcher and the subjects, it successfully prevented 
transcription errors, and it allowed for real-time monitoring.  
The difference in cost of the web based survey versus the traditional survey was 
tremendous. The study by Couper in 1999 showed no significant cost benefit of an e-mail 
survey compared with a traditional mail survey (61). He suggested that the cost in 
constructing e-mail surveys required more than 150 hours and approximately cost $1.74 
per completed case, while the cost of postage-mail was $1.81 per reply.  For this study, 
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the researcher, using an available online software service (www.questionpro.com), took 
approximately 3 hours to convert the survey from a paper format to the web based 
format. This survey’s total cost per respondent was less than 5¢ each ($109.95, labor $60 
and 1 month software lease $49.95). Using the $1.81 figure suggested by Couper, this 
bioterrorism survey would have cost a minimum of $4,123.18 USD by postage-mail. This 
calculation does not include the 22,800 invitations sent (50¢ each) and the increase in 
postage stamps since 1999. 
The use of the email/ web model survey instrument also proved to be a time 
efficient method for surveying Florida’s healthcare providers. The survey was completed 
in 7 days from start to finish, with most of the subject responding within days 1-3. A 
reminder was sent out at midnight on day 3 to all study subjects, which allowed a surge in 
responses on day 4 and 5. The two other planned reminders were not sent out because the 
study received the required number of respondents early on, and the researcher did not 
want to give the impression of “spam” emails to the subjects whom had already 
completed the survey.  For the subjects, the survey was also more time efficient because 
the technique of branching was utilized. This allowed subjects to jump non-applicable 
questions within the survey based on their previous answer.   
The data was recorded electronically, which reduced transcription errors to zero. 
While data quality based on the percentage of respondents who missed at least one 
questionnaire item is controversial, it was suggested by Paolo et al. that the traditional 
mail survey had a lower rate of incomplete returned questionnaires compared with the 
email survey, 27% vs. 9%. (75).  This was not the case in this study with an 85.7% 
completion of all questions.  
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Finally, mail/web survey permitted the researcher to monitor the survey in real-
time, allowing constant updates of the number of individuals who were currently taking 
the survey, and the number who exited without completion and successfully completed it.  
The only real down sides are lower response rate because the researcher allowed 
only 1 week completing the survey and did not allow second attempt, if the first attempt 
was incomplete. The uncompleted survey may have been a factor related to the busy 
schedule of healthcare providers that could not finish the survey in one sitting. 
Additionally, in the months following the survey closure, 100s of providers 
continued to visit the site and to reply to the invitation email, seeking to take the survey 
or view the results from the survey. This suggests that the research topic is one of 
concern to the healthcare providers within Florida and that the response rate could have 
been much higher.   
 
The Assessment of the Providers Competency Levels 
 The assessment of the providers’ competency levels was the core component of 
this study. This assessment of the competencies should provide Florida with a better 
understanding of its current provider preparedness levels and what areas the needs to be 
focused upon for improvement.  
 
The Individual Core Competencies 
Within this study, the core bioterrorism competencies were used to evaluate the 
provider’s administrative skills and the clinical knowledge. Each of these core 
competencies represents an individual base knowledge area that is deemed necessary to 
have to be minimally prepared to identify and manage a bioterrorist attack.   
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The eight administrative competencies should be very basic, such as using 
communication equipment (i.e. fax), and knowing one’s role in a bioterrorism response. 
It is not specialized knowledge, such as the ability to manage a nuclear incident response 
or being able to disarm a dirty bomb. These would be considered advance skills for the 
average provider and not set at a core level for his/her job description. This is a very 
common mistake when governmental agencies and private entities are developing and/or 
adjusting the core competency sets for it organizations. This is because many of the 
administrative core competencies seem to be too basic at first glance, as with AC3, the 
correct use of communications equipment, such as phones, radios, and fax machines.  
Nevertheless, it was found that only 72.7% of the Florida’s providers had an acceptable 
competency level in this area. This means if one of those 27.3% healthcare providers 
needed to report a possible bioterrorism attack and could not operate the basic 
communication equipment, this would possibly place lives in jeopardy.  
The clinical core competencies, while still basic knowledge, are more related to the 
healthcare providers’ clinical ability to identify and manage a bioterrorism attack.  These 
included such knowledge areas as being able to describe his/her expected clinical role in 
a bioterrorism response (73.9%) and the ability to recognize and manage the 
psychological impact of a bioterrorism event (46.1%). Overall, the individual clinical 
competency (CC1-8) scores are much lower than the administrative competency (AC1-8) 
scores. The results of this study revealed that Florida’s providers’ un-weighted CC (1-8) 
average is only 44.2% (physicians 48.9%, nurses 44.9%, and pharmacists 37.0%) and the 
un-weighted AC(1-8) average is 61.2% (physicians 59.1%, nurses 65.2%, and 
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pharmacists 54.9%).  The individual strength and weaknesses by provider type can be 
examined in Chapter 4, Results. 
 
The Administrative Competency Level and Clinical Competency Level 
The Administrative Competency Level (ACL) and Clinical Competency Level 
(CCL) are the weighted averages of administrative competencies and the weighted 
averages of the clinical competencies, respectively. The use of the weighted scores 
helped to adjust the importance of a knowledge area (see Chapter 3, Methods for details). 
For example, AC3, the use of a fax is not rated by experts as important as the AC9, 
creative problem solving. The results from this study reported that the ACL average was 
62.8% and the CCL average was only 44.9%. These weighted scores increased the ACL 
for 61.2% un-weighted to 62.8% weighted and the CCL from 44.2% un-weighted to 
44.9% weighted in this study’s sample.  Within another setting (i.e. health department 
employees, hospital, or State of Alabama), these adjustments of the individual scores may 
greatly increase or decrease the ACL and CCL scores.   
 
The Bioterrorism Competency Level 
The bioterrorism competency level (BCL) is used to score the overall competency 
level of the individual and the grouping as a whole. The BCL looks at only the weighted 
knowledge (competency level) of the providers, not the overall preparedness levels.  The 
BCL in this study was 51.1%. This suggests that only 51% of Florida’s community 
healthcare providers have the minimum bioterrorism competency level to identify and 
manage an event without hurting themselves and/or others.  
  123
These results of the BCL should convince the FDOH to move some of its 
bioterrorism training and exercise dollars away its professional emergency planners / 
coordinators, to the community’s healthcare providers.  The bioterrorism trainings 
developed over the past two years by FDOH, various Florida universities and the other 
contracted entities, have all been presented at an awareness level. There have been little, 
if any operational level training conducted.  These types of trainings, hopefully, do not 
better prepare the FDOH emergency planner/ coordinator. These planner/ coordinators 
should already possess awareness level knowledge prior to being hired. With only 
awareness training, it would be correct to say that the emergency planner/ coordinators 
would be very aware of an attack, but would not know what to do to correct the issue. 
Unlike hurricanes, where the FDOH responds after the impact of the event, a bioterrorism 
attack is ongoing and the threat may or may not be present during the response. The 
emergency planners / coordinators, along with the executive staff (county health 
department directors), will not be able to use its standard practice of working thought the 
event, learning as you go, without endangering the health and safety of themselves and 
the population. 
On the other hand, the administering of awareness training to community health 
providers would greatly increase the preparedness levels of the community healthcare 
providers and possible encourage the formation of a volunteer grassroots health care 
emergency response system (provider volunteers), and also increase enrollment of the 
Florida’s Medical Reserve Corps (MRC). These providers will be needed to successfully 
activate the county emergency management plans during a bioterrorism event and/or 
mass casualty incident. The results of this study suggested that providers who have had 
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previous trainings (beta= .1049, p=.000) and/or drills (beta = .941, p=.000) were over 2.5 
times more likely to be prepared than providers not trained or drilled.      
 
 
The Assessment of the Providers Willingness to Respond 
The assessment of the providers’ willingness to respond was also a core component 
of this study. This assessment of the provider’s willingness to respond to various 
proximities across Florida and to different levels of risk (high risk / low risk, defined in 
Chapter 3, Methods) should provide Florida with a better understanding of its current 
preparedness levels and moreover, to provide a more accurate estimate of the expected 
volunteer provider levels during an event. These provider estimates will hopefully be 
used for pre-incident planning of personnel expectations of projected large scale 
emergencies. 
This study results suggested that most Florida providers were willing to respond to 
both a high risk (HR) event and a low risk (LR) event within their local community 
(81.7% and 82.8%, respectively, see Chapter 4, Results). In the Alexander and Wynia’s 
study (2003), it was suggested that physicians were willing to respond 80% of the time in 
a lower risk environment, 40% in a higher risk environment and 33% in the highest risk 
environment.(45)  Florida physicians however, reported that 84.5% would respond to a 
HR event and 83.6% would respond to a low LR event within their local community. 
This elevated willingness to respond score in HR events could possibly be explained by 
the proximity factor. In the Alexander and Wynia study, no proximity was expressed. 
When a disaster affects your friends, family and neighbors, physicians may be more 
willing to help, even when the risk is higher. In contrast, when Florida physicians were 
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asked if they were willing to respond to biological agent attacks outside their local 
community, only 53.6% of all subjects reported that they are willing to respond to a HR 
event. While it is still much higher than the previous study, the physicians’ willingness 
level dropped over 20 percent points.  
The remaining gap in the differences may be explained by the providers seeking 
out bioterrorism training activities and/ or participating in drills and exercises since 2003. 
The results from this study indicate that previous trainings (beta = .286, p=.010) and 
drills (beta = .436, p=.000) were significant predictors of the willingness to respond. So, 
it is suggestive that healthcare providers that had attended bioterrorism drills were 1.55 
times more likely to be willing to respond to a bioterrorism attack compared with 
providers who have never participated in drills, or if that healthcare provider has had a 
previous emergency preparedness training, they were 1.33 times more likely to be willing 
to respond to a bioterrorism attack compared with no previous trainings.  
It was also found that providers under 24 (66.7%) and between the ages of 55-64 
(59.6) were the most willing to respond to a statewide event. Females (54.5%) are more 
willing than males (53.7%). American Indians (n=7, 83.3%) and African Americans 
(65.9%) were more likely to respond than Caucasians (52.8%) and Asian/ Pacific 
Islanders (53.7%). Providers with associate degrees (59.1%) are more likely to respond 
than providers with doctorate degrees (53.7%) and the foreign educated (n=10, 50.0%). 
Providers with a primarily work place in a clinic setting (60.4%) and non-teaching 
hospital (56.4%) are much more like to respond than providers that work in the home 
health care setting (40.9%) or in a university/research setting (41.9%).  
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The researcher’s main concern over these statistics was the lack of willingness to 
respond by the majority of the providers that are assigned to care for the sick in their 
homes (home health setting, 40.9%). This is a legal requirement of provider companies 
that have licensed home health companies within the state. This has been an ongoing 
issue during other emergencies, such as hurricanes / flooding with the activation of the 
special needs shelters.  At the time of the study, this issue was awaiting address by the 
State legislature. Home health agencies do not want to be required to provide care for 
their patients during the time of emergencies, and for their patients at special needs 
shelters. This issue, which is not normally addressed in the CEMP, should be addressed 
or corrected.  
The willing to respond to a statewide event was used in the calculation of the 
overall providers’ preparedness level. The statewide calculation was used because the 
boundaries are more defined than the local community and in an event of a large scale 
event, as Florida’s Strategic National Stockpile plans are written, it will take providers 
from across the state to activate the plans and treat the patients effectively.  
 
The Assessment of the Providers Overall Preparedness Level (PL) 
The overall bioterrorism preparedness level of the public health system, FDOH and 
the community healthcare providers has been in question since the 2001 anthrax attacks. 
If the physician, who reported the 1st case of inhalation anthrax in Florida, did not 
recognize the symptoms (competency), and was not willing to be proactive throughout 
the response (willingness to response), the outcome would have been much worse.   
The calculation of the bioterrorism preparedness level (PL) was the final step 
within the study’s conceptual framework. It combined the providers’ bioterrorism 
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competency level (BCL) and their willing to respond to a statewide event by matching 
individual providers scores. To be deemed prepared, the provider must be willing to 
respond at least 50% of the time and have a BCL greater than 50%.   
When the WTR and BCL were examined separately, the providers’ WTR to a 
statewide event was 53.7% and their BCL was 51.1%. But when the WTR and BCL were 
Matched, the PL scores dropped to 32.2% for the community providers (physicians 
34.6%, nurses 38.4% and pharmacists 17.4%, see Figure 4-5). This indicates that 32.2% 
of Florida’s community healthcare providers had both the minimal level of competency 
to effectively function without endangering him/herself and others, and are willing to 
respond to a bioterrorism attack within the State of Florida. The nurses were recognized 
as more prepared than the other subgroups due to their skills in both the ACL and CCL. 
Physicians had the highest CCL but lacked the nurses on the ACL. The pharmacist scored 
lowest in both the ACL and CCL. This may be due to their normal job functions and the 
perception of the not being a direct clinical provider during an attack.  So, the pharmacist 
may not perceived benefits of bioterrorism training and not sought it out, which is a 
predictor for being prepared for bioterrorism attack. If a provider had participated in a 
training, he/she is 2.86 more time likely to be prepared than a provider who has not been 
trained. 
The examination of the ACL, the CCL, the BCL and the WTR scores individually 
(as described above) are very beneficial in identifying areas to target for interventions 
and trainings. However, when the scores have been calculated and matched, this allows 
for a more accurate provider preparedness level. Providers may be willing to respond but 
lack the skills to function and, providers may be 100% competent in their skills, but never 
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responds to the event. In the onset of the event, it is more important to be competent in 
identifying the attack (competent).  Once the event is ongoing, it is more important to be 
willing to respond. Both roles should be addressed when looking at the providers’ 
preparedness levels.  
It was also found that, even though females were more willing to respond and had a 
higher competency level than males, male providers were 1.32 times more likely to be 
prepared for the bioterrorism attack than female.  This is explained by the fact that the 
females, who were competent, were not willing to respond and, the females that were 
willing to respond were not as competent. 
In a earlier nationwide survey, only 25 percent of family physicians felt prepared to 
respond to a bioterrorist event in 2001 (5) and again in 2002, only 21 percent of the 
physicians surveyed, felt personally well prepared for a bioterrorism attack (45). In 
comparison, the findings of this study suggest that 55.5% of Florida’s community 
healthcare providers do NOT feel prepared and 41.5% feel somewhat prepared to identify 
and manage a bioterrorism attack (see Figure 4-6). Only 3.0 of Florida’s providers feel 
very prepared. Since the personal perception of individual preparedness, “feeling” 
prepared, was defined by the subject, this study can only be generally compared (feeling 
prepared or feeling not prepared) to the 2001 and 2003 surveys. While 75% of the 
surveyed provider did not feel prepare in 2001, and 79% of the surveyed did not feel 
prepared in 2002, this 2005 survey of Florida’s providers suggest that only 55.5% do not 
feel prepared. This increase in perceived preparedness levels, the “feeling” of being 
prepared, suggests that providers have more current confidence in their knowledge base 
and clinical skills. This could be a direct result of bioterrorism trainings and drills 
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received or the fact the issue of bioterrorism is less prevalent in society, than in 2001 and 
2002. 
 
List of Study Limitations 
1. This study only surveyed providers that had an active email listed. 
2. The selection of the subjects was based on the e-mail listed in a public 
database of licensed healthcare providers.   The lists might not be completed 
or updated, e.g., number of members, e-mail addresses, current job setting.  
This might results in the eliminations of some populations from the study, 
who were listed as working in the institutional settings (hospitals), but actually 
they work in the community setting.     
3. Although the researcher reviewed the e-mail lists closely and corrected most 
of obviously incorrect e-mail addresses in the lists, the errors remained and 
cannot be corrected by the researcher.  This issue posted a problem of high 
undelivered e-mails with the invitation letters.   
4. The number of questionnaires that should be sent out to obtain the required 
sample size for statistical power was calculated for each healthcare profession 
based on the same response rate.  The response rates of electronic surveys 
might be different among healthcare professions.  However, the researcher 
decided to use the same rate, but conservative (low response rate), across the 
selected professions. 
5. The responses may have been influenced by a socially desirable bias in this 
time of War on Terror. 
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6. Even though the questionnaire obtained a response rate similar to other web 
based surveys, African Americans may have not received appropriate 
representation within the study.  
7. The administrative, clinical and social demographic characteristics that was 
recognized, only explained a small variance for the subject overall 
preparedness levels and willingness to respond. The defining characteristics of 
a bioterrorism response by healthcare providers are multifaceted and complex.   
8. The researcher is not able to identify whether the non-responders were similar 
to the responders or not.  It is difficult to eliminate response biases.  For 
example, the responders might be the subjects who were interested or 
involved in preparedness of bioterrorism events.   
9. The Bioterrorism Preparedness Model and the questionnaire were designed to 
fulfill the study’s objectives. Further statistical validation of the Bioterrorism 
Preparedness Model and the questionnaire is continuing. 
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Conclusion and Implications 
This study was motivated by the recognized threat of bioterrorism attack upon 
Florida’s population and the uncertainty that the planning efforts by the State of Florida 
since 2001 could be operationalized during a biological terrorism attack. It has been able 
to determined Florida’s community healthcare providers’ overall preparedness levels and 
by provider subgroups, and to suggest the key factors that influence these levels. This 
study also determined the willingness of the provider to respond to a bioterrorism attack 
within the State of Florida at various proximities and risk levels. 
The conceptual framework was created to serve the study’s objectives. It consisted 
of three domains, the first two were based on the core competency sets (administrative 
and clinical) whose development was sponsored by the CDC and used by numerous 
entities across the nation, and the third is the providers’ willingness to respond. This 
framework also included a methodology to calculate the bioterrorism competency and 
preparedness levels based on the importance of several leading experts in the field of 
public health preparedness at the time of this study.  This was the first study that 
attempted a methodology to actually measure the provider’s preparedness levels, and to 
examine physicians, nurses and pharmacist as a single provider grouping. Past provider 
studies have mainly examined physicians or nurses, but in a real event all licensed 
providers will be called upon.   
The study’s results are useful identifying critical areas for bioterrorism 
preparedness training and education, and the improving of bioterrorism planning and 
preparedness. The conceptual framework and its measurements, can be used to 
benchmark between provider groupings, between states and between organizations of all 
sizes.  It also could be used as a base line of preparedness levels, which can be used to 
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document changes over set periods of time. These changes can be used to monitor 
whether interventions are successful and justify the continuation of federal funded 
projects. Finally and most important, this study can guide emergency planners/ 
coordinators better project in the pre-disaster phase, the number of healthcare providers 
that are willing and able to respond to a bioterrorist attack.   
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APPENDIX A 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 
FLORIDA HEALTH CARE PROVIDER BIOTERRORISM PREPAREDNESS SURVEY  
 
 
Welcome!! I am asking for your help as a part of a survey I am conducting 
regarding Florida health care providers’ Bioterrorism preparedness levels and their 
willingness to respond.  
 
COMPLETING THE ONLINE SURVEY: Please plan on taking about 15 minutes to 
complete the following survey. You must complete the survey in one sitting. You will not 
be able to go back to previous questions or to change answers. When you have completed 
the survey, please click on the button that says “continue.” Your candid answers are 
important to ensure an accurate assessment of Florida’s health care provider’s 
bioterrorism preparedness levels. Please answer the questions on your own and to the best 
of your ability, without using any resources (books, websites, co-workers).  
 
CONFIDENTIALITY: Your participation in this survey is strictly confidential. No 
information about you, or provided by you, will be disclosed to others. No personal data 
(i.e., Name, Address, Employer Name) will be collected in the survey. The identities of 
individuals who complete the survey and their results will be kept confidential. Individual 
results will not be released. Any reports, publications, or other materials developed from 
results of this survey will not contain any identifying information about you.  
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FURTHER INFORMATION: If you have any questions about this survey or how the 
information will be used, please contact Mr. Jeffrey Crane at 704-865-8902 or e-mail 
jcrane@jscrane.com. If you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
please contact the USF Office of Research at 813-974-5570.  
Thank you for participating in this important assessment survey. Your time and 
effort are greatly appreciated! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© J.S. Crane, LLC 2004-2005. All Rights Reserved 
To get permission to use, please email Jeffrey Crane at: 
 jcrane@jscrane.com or visit www.jscrane.com  
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
 Question 1. What is your current AGE? *  
 
 Under 18 
 18 - 24 
 25 - 34 
 35 - 44 
 45 - 54 
 55 - 64 
 65 or older  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 2. What is your GENDER? *  
 
 Male 
 Female  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 3. What is your RACE? *  
 
 Caucasian  
 African American  
 American Indian, Eskimo, or Aleut  
 Asian or Pacific Islander  
 Hispanic  
 Other   
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 4. What is the HIGHEST EDUCATIONAL DEGREE that you have completed? 
*  
 
 Associate's degree  
 Bachelor's degree 
 Master's degree  
 Doctorate (DO, Ph.D, MD, PharmD, DDS)  
 Foreign Educated (Please Specify)        
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 5. How many years have you worked as a licensed professional? *  
 
 Less than 1 year 
 1 to 2 years  
 3 to 5 years 
 6 to 10 years 
 11 to 20 years 
 Over 20 years  
 I have NOT WORKED as a licensed professional.   
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 6. Which of the following BEST represents your current position? *  
 
 MD- Medical Doctor 
 DO- Doctor of Osteopathy  
 NP- Nurse Practitioner 
 RN- Registered Nurse 
 RPh- Registered Pharmacist  
 Pharm.D.- Doctor of Pharmacy  
 Other (Please Specify)        
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 7. I am currently: *  
 
 Employed in a Healthcare Setting 
 Not Employed in a Healthcare Setting  
 Unemployed 
 Retired   
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 8. What is your PRIMARY work place? *  
 
 Hospital, none Teaching  
 Teaching Hospital  
 Long-term Care, none Home Healthcare 
 Home Healthcare  
 Private Single Practice 
 Private Multi-Physician Practice 
 Clinic Setting 
 Institutional Pharmacy (Hospital and Long-term Care) 
 Community Pharmacy (Retail/Chain) 
 University or Research Setting 
 I am Retired.  
 Other, Please Specify:        
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 9. Average 2002-2003 patient encounter volume for your PRIMARY work 
place? *  
 
 Under 5,000 
 5,000 – 9,999 
 10,000 – 19,999  
 20,000 – 39,999 
 40,000 – 59,999  
 60,000 – 79,999  
 80,000 + 
 Not Applicable   
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Please select all answers that apply (Required)  
  
Question 10. Services that YOU provide in your PRIMARY work place? (Please Check 
ALL That Apply): *  
 
 General Medicine  
 ICU/CCU 
 Mental Health 
 Substance Abuse 
 Pediatric Medicine  
 Laboratory 
 X-Ray 
 Institutional Pharmacy Services (Hospital and Long-term Care)  
 Community Pharmacy Services (Retail/Chain) 
 Obstetrical 
 Gynecology 
 Inpatient Surgery 
 Outpatient Surgery  
 Emergency Room Services, none Trauma 
 Trauma Center Services 
 Home Health Care Services  
 Public Health (Epidemiology and Immunizations)  
 Long-term Care Nursing Service  
 Teaching / Research 
 I am Retired. 
 Other, Please Specify:      
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 11. Which of the following BEST describes the city or county where you work? 
*  
 
 Rural  
 Urban 
 Suburban   
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 12. Which of the following BEST describes the population size of the city or 
county where you work? *  
 
 Small City (Less than 25,000 persons)  
 Medium City (25,000 to 75,000 persons) 
 Large City (Greater than 75,000 persons)  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 13. Does your organization have an Emergency Response/ Disaster plan? *  
 
 Yes 
 NO, We do not have an Emergency Response/ Disaster plan.  
 I Do NOT know.   
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 14. I know where the plan is located? *  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't Know   
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 15. I have reviewed the plan in the last 12 months? *  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't Know   
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 16. I know my role according to the plan? *  
 
 Yes 
 No  
 Don't Know   
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 17. Did the Plan have a special organizational structure and organized 
leadership (e.g., incident command system) during a disaster or emergency? *  
 
 Yes  
 No 
 Don't Know  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 18. Does the plan specifically address bioterrorism? *  
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Don't Know   
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 19. Does the plan address emergency communications? *  
 
 Yes  
 No 
 Don't Know   
 
Please select all answers that apply (Required)  
  
Question 20. Please check ALL of the following statements that are TRUE. *  
 
 I am competent in the operation of a telephone.  
 I am competent in the operation of a fax machine. 
 I am competent in the operation of a two-way radio.  
 I am competent in the operation of a satellite phone.  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 21. Have you participated in a disaster drill within the last 12 months? *  
 
 Yes 
 NO I have not participated in a disaster drill within the last 12 months.   
 
Please select all answers that apply (Required)  
  
Question 22. Types of the disaster drills that you participated: (Check ALL that Apply) *  
 
 Biological agent exposure  
 Bomb threat  
 Chemical agent exposure  
 Nuclear/radiology agent exposure 
 Mass casualty  
 Not Applicable 
 Other (Please List)        
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 23. Have you received training in disaster awareness, preparedness, and 
response? *  
 
 Yes  
 NO I have not received training in disaster awareness, preparedness, and 
response.  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 24. I received training within the last 12 months? *  
 
 Yes  
 No  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 25. My training included preparedness for chemical or biological terrorism 
events? *  
 
 Yes 
 No  
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 26. It was an annual “Refresher” training in disaster preparedness? *  
 
 Yes  
 No   
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Please select all answers that apply (Required)  
  
Question 27. What type of training did you receive? (Check ALL that Apply.) *  
 
 Biological agent exposure  
 Bomb threat  
 Chemical agent exposure  
 Nuclear/radiology agent exposure  
 Mass casualty  
 Other (Please List)        
Please select all answers that apply (Required)  
  
Question 28. When you participated in training for bioterrorism, which of the following 
teaching methods/ modalities were used? (Please check ALL that Apply) *  
 
 Traditional lecture Format (I.e., slides, handouts, videos, etc.)  
 Online interactive (i.e., Discussion boards, tutorials, simulations, etc)  
 Web-casts, teleconferences, or satellite broadcasts 
 Self learn, self paced study (i.e., independent study courses)  
 Other       
 
Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 29. Generally Speaking, which SINGLE METHOD/MODALITY would you 
prefer for future bioterrorism content training? *  
 
 Traditional lecture Format (I.e., slides, handouts, videos, etc.) 
 Online interactive (i.e., Discussion boards, tutorials, simulations, etc)  
 Web-casts, teleconferences, or satellite broadcasts  
 Self learn, self paced study (i.e., independent study courses)   
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 30. Generally Speaking, in Self-learning content on bioterrorism, which would 
be the SINGLE BEST source for you? *  
 
 A Textbook  
 Information packets  
 Journal articles 
 Brochures 
 Video  
 Pre-prepared PowerPoint Slides  
 Online Resources  
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 31. Bioterrorism attacks are a real 
threat within the UNITED STATES? *  
          
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 32. Bioterrorism attacks are a real 
threat within FLORIDA? *  
          
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 33. Bioterrorism attacks are a real threat 
within your LOCAL COMMUNITY? *  
          
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 34. My LOCAL medical community could 
effectively respond to a Bioterrorism attack? *  
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 35. I know my role as a health provider 
in a suspected Bioterrorism attack in my 
community? *  
         
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 36. I know the “Chain of Command” for 
my work place in a suspected bioterrorism attack 
in my community? *  
         
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 37. I know my WORK PLACE’S role in a 
suspected Bioterrorism attack in my community? * 
        
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree  
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 38. I know whom to call to report/refer 
a suspected bioterrorism attack? *  
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Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 39. I would recognize signs and 
symptoms of an illness due to bioterrorism in my 
own patients? *  
         
 
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 40. I would recognize and treat the 
psychological effects to victims and healthcare 
professionals due to a bioterrorism attack? *  
         
 
 
Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neither 
Agree 
nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly 
Disagree
Question 41. I know my limits in knowledge, 
skill, and authority in a suspected bioterrorism 
attack? *  
         
 
Question 42. How important is it for your LOCAL HEALTHCARE SYSTEM to be 
prepared for a bioterrorism attack? *  
 
 Very Important  Important   Not Important At All   
 
Question 43. How important is it for YOU to be trained to identify a possible bioterrorism 
attack? *  
 
Very Important    Important   Not Important At All   
 
Question 44. What is your current knowledge of the medical aspects of the DIAGNOSIS 
of bioterrorism related illnesses is: *  
 
 Poor   Fair   Good   Very Good  
 
 
Question 45. What is your current knowledge of the medical aspects of the 
MANAGEMENT of bioterrorism related illnesses is: *  
 
 Poor  Fair   Good   Very Good  
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Please select all answers that apply (Required)  
  
Question 46. From the list below, please choose ALL of the known bioterrorism 
agents/diseases? *  
 
 Tetanus (Tetanus)  
 Bacillus Anthracis (Antrax)  
 Bacterial Meningitis (Meningitis)  
 Clostridium Botulinum Toxin (Botulism)  
 Schistosomiasis (Schistosomiasis)  
 Francisella Tularensis (Tularemia)  
 Varicella Disease (Chickenpox)  
 Yersinia Pestis (Plague) 
 Parvovirus B19 Infection (Fifth Disease)  
 Variola Major (Smallpox)   
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Question 47. Please READ the following Disease Description 
and CORRECTLY identify the disease from the list below?   
*  
 
 Bacillus Anthracis (Anthrax)  
 Clostridium Botulinum Toxin (Botulism)  
 Yersinia Pestis (Plague)  
 Viral Encephalitis   
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Question 48. Which of the following Pictures CORRECTLY 
illustrates the typical pattern of smallpox rash distribution? 
(please do NOT look up!)   
*  
 
 Case A  
 Case B 
 Both Cases A and B  
 None of the Above  
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Question 49. Examine the two sets of pictures of the rash of four different days (day 3, 
day 5, day 7 and day 10). Which set is Smallpox? (Please do NOT look up!)  
  
*  
 
 Set A (Red)  
 Set B (Blue)  
 Both Sets A and B  
 None of the Above   
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INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer ALL the following questions as CANDIDLY as 
possible. (Please Note that a HIGH RISK event is defined as a bioterrorism agent that 
does NOT have a known treatment and/or vaccination.)  
 
QUESTION: How likely do you believe that YOU would respond to a bioterrorism event 
if your medical services were requested:  
  
 
Very 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely  
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely  
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Very 
Unlikely 
Question 50. in a HIGH RISK event that 
affects YOUR COMMUNITY? *  
          
 
Question 51. in a HIGH RISK event that 
affects a NEIGHBORING COUNTY? *  
          
 
Question 52. in a HIGH RISK event that 
affects FLORIDA? *  
          
 
Question 53. in a HIGH RISK event that 
affects the UNITED STATES? *  
         
 
 
 
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer ALL the following questions as CANDIDLY as 
possible. (Please Note that a LOW RISK event is defined as a bioterrorism agent that 
has a known treatment and/or vaccination.)  
 
QUESTION: How likely do you believe that YOU would respond to a bioterrorism event 
if your medical services were requested:  
  
 
Very 
Likely 
Somewhat 
Likely  
Neither 
Likely or 
Unlikely  
Somewhat 
Unlikely 
Very 
Unlikely 
Question 54. in a LOW RISK event that affects 
YOUR COMMUNITY? *  
          
 
Question 55. in a LOW RISK event that affects 
a NEIGHBORING COUNTY? *  
          
 
Question 56. in a LOW RISK event that affects 
FLORIDA? *  
          
 
Question 57. in a LOW RISK event that affects 
the UNITED STATES *  
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Please select a single answer (Required)  
  
Question 58. Do you "feel" prepared to diagnose and manage a bioterrorism attack? *  
 
 Very Prepared  Somewhat Prepared   Not Prepared  
 
Enter 5-Digits Only  
  
 
Question 59. Please enter your ZIPCODE. *    
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